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I. INTRODUCTION
The scene: a meeting between a lawyer and her client.  The follow-
ing are the lawyer’s observations, as told to and reported by a
journalist:
The front room was empty except for two small desks arranged near the
center.  A door in the back opened to reveal dozens of young women and chil-
dren huddled together.  Many were gaunt and malnourished, with dark circles
under their eyes.  “The kids were really sick,” [the lawyer reported].  “A lot of
the moms were holding them in their arms, even the older kids—holding them
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like babies, and they’re screaming and crying, and some of them are lying
there listlessly.”1
Out of context, the lawyer’s observations paint a portrait of a scene
from a refugee camp or from the depths of a developing country.  Per-
haps she is describing families escaping war and bloodshed in a be-
sieged part of the world.
But this scene took place much closer to home—in a government-
run immigrant family detention center, located in the isolated, dusty
town of Artesia, New Mexico, in 2014.  The lawyer was meeting with
women and their children who have fled from various Central Ameri-
can countries to the United States, seeking safety from the ravages of
violence and poverty in their home countries.  When they are captured
by or turn themselves in to the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol
(CBP), these women and children are locked away.  Euphemistically
called “family residential centers” by the U.S. government, it is most
accurate to report the truth: the U.S. government is imprisoning wo-
men and children.
With its storied narrative of welcoming shores and cries of “bring
me your huddled masses,”2 one may wonder how American immigra-
tion law and policy arrived at the practice of imprisoning mothers and
children.  And, importantly, a critical observer may query under
which foundation does this behemoth prison industrial complex, full of
detained immigrants, lie.  This Article explores these questions and
argues that the social and political subordination of immigrants—who
embody the marginalized identities of criminals, non-citizens, and
persons of color—feed the profit-seeking carceral machine.  The
symbiotic relationship between the lucrative prison business and the
societal and political pressures for stricter immigration law and pol-
icy, driven by these multiple marginalized identities, result in the im-
prisonment of more immigrants.  The current practice of locking up
mothers and children illustrates the breadth of this complex.  Impor-
tantly, and as this Article argues, the success of the corporate prison
model relies and flourishes on the continued oppression of immi-
grants.  Though the discussion in this Article of the continued impris-
onment of immigrants who are mothers and children helps illuminate
the practice, it serves to provide just one stark example of the long-
standing and well-established policy of immigrant detention.
Part II of the Article sets a foundation regarding the history and
constitutional underpinnings of immigrant detention in order to un-
derstand the legal and political genesis of the current scheme.  By pro-
1. Wil S. Hylton, The Shame of America’s Family Detention Camps, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/magazine/the-shame-of-
americas-family-detention-camps.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/7E5F-
UELM.
2. EMMA LAZARUS, THE NEW COLOSSUS (1883).
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viding a snapshot of the current state of immigrant detention, this
discussion presents the arrival of a record number of immigrant
mothers and children to the United States in 2014 as a case study to
elaborate on the role that detention plays in the immigration enforce-
ment system.
Part III builds on this foundation and explores the immigration
prison-industrial complex.  Section III.A begins by providing a brief
history of the societal, legal, and political foundations of the current
enormous carceral state—including the political movements of the
war on drugs and against supposedly lax criminal justice policies.  In
this discussion, attention is paid to the growing influence of the prison
industry in the political and legislative process to secure its continued
success.  Section III.B then expands this exploration to the immigrant-
detention context, noting how the same trends—the war on drugs,
crime, and, to an extent, terrorism—have resulted in massive in-
creases in the number of immigrants detained.  Again, prison corpora-
tions and entities have gained enormous profits due to these efforts,
including, more recently, remarkable financial gains due to the deten-
tion of mothers and children.
Part IV then illuminates the necessary ingredient for this en-
deavor to be so successful.  As a non-citizen with few to no rights and
privileges in the United States, the immigrant prisoner is easy for the
larger society to ignore.  Immigrants are perceived as criminals and
thus suffer the effects of this marginalizing identity.  The effect is es-
pecially insidious in this context because the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act (INA) provides that immigrants may be imprisoned despite
any finding of flight risk, danger to the larger community, criminal
history or, indeed, adjudicated finding of wrongdoing.  Incarcerated
for suspected infractions of the INA—which are civil offenses, not
criminal—detained immigrants often have no legal counsel and lim-
ited due process protections.  Further, as a person of color—or per-
ceived to be of color—the immigrant suffers the additional long-term,
chronic effects of racial political subordination.3 Again using the ex-
ample of imprisoned mothers and children, Part IV highlights the op-
pressive power of subordination.  Because immigrants are deemed
unworthy of protection due to this powerful intersection of subordi-
nated identities, corporatized monetary interests continue to exploit
their continued detention for increased profits while calls for humani-
tarian protections are largely ignored.  It is only because the affected
population is a marginalized and historically oppressed group that
such efforts can continue—and succeed—unabated.
3. Although immigrants of all races and ethnic backgrounds are subject to deten-
tion, as established in Part IV, the overwhelming majority of detained immi-
grants are Latina/o. See infra Part IV.
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Part V therefore argues that comprehensive immigration reform
must account for this reality and embrace measures that disrupt these
toxic connections.  Because imprisoning people has become lucrative
due to the power of oppressing the marginalized, legislative and advo-
cacy measures must work to disrupt the intersections between profit-
ability and oppression.  This Part advocates for changes to the INA to
restrict immigrant detention for the most critical cases.  Further, law
and policy must reject the goal of corporate profit in the detention pro-
cess, such that for-profit entities are either banned from the prison
business or leave it due to decreased profits in the face of increased
scrutiny.  As a model of disruptive change, Part V then looks to an
example of when calls for humane treatment of the oppressed nega-
tively affected corporations that previously benefitted from such op-
pression.  In particular, this Part explores how political and social
movements successfully influenced pharmaceutical companies to end
the sale of drugs used for lethal injections to U.S. states that were
using the drugs for that purpose.  Next, Part V argues that the profit
goals of detention must be erased completely, such that for-profit “al-
ternatives to detention” do not merely replace the current default to
detention scheme.  To conclude, Part V sets forth a call toward follow-
ing these paths and ending the widespread reliance on immigration
detention.
II. THE ROAD TO AND REALITIES OF
IMMIGRANT DETENTION
As an important preliminary matter, it bears clarifying what this
Article means when it uses the term “immigrant.”  According to the
INA, a person in immigrant status is a foreign-born person who comes
to the United States with a permanent intent to remain.4  The term as
used for statutory purposes is more limited than the way in which I
use it here; the statutory definition does not generally, for example,
include nonimmigrants who are foreign-born people that arrive with
the intent to stay temporarily.5  Yet, both categories of people per the
INA labels—immigrants and nonimmigrants—can lawfully be de-
tained under the INA detention provisions, described more fully be-
low.6  The more appropriate term under the INA to fully describe the
category of people who could be detained, then, is “alien.”7  Like many
others, however, I do not use the term “alien” due to its pejorative and
4. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)
(2012) (defining “immigrant” as an alien who is not a nonimmigrant).
5. See id. (outlining the various nonimmigrant visa categories, which prescribe tem-
porary lawfulness on the holder).
6. See infra section II.A.
7. See INA § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (“The term ‘alien’ means any person not
a citizen or national of the United States.”).
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de-humanizing connotations other than when it is essential to the le-
gal, cultural, or social context.8  Thus, this Article uses “immigrant” to
describe the affected community.
An immigrant could be detained at many times and junctures in
the United States.  Indeed, at any time from when the immigrant
physically enters—or attempts to enter—the United States to the
time when the immigrant naturalizes and becomes a U.S. citizen (if
naturalization is even a possibility), he or she can be subjected to de-
tention by the U.S. government under the INA.9  This Part begins by
providing a brief historical entry into the legal basis for this broad
power to detain and then presents a snapshot of current trends, data,
and the practical realities of immigrant detention.  As an insightful
example, the discussion uses the recent increase in the Department of
Homeland Security’s (DHS) detention of mothers and children to high-
light the breadth of the practice.
A. The Origins of Immigrant Detention
The practice of detaining immigrants for alleged civil infractions
derives from the INA.  The well-established plenary power doctrine
affords broad and near unassailable powers to Congress to establish
immigration law and policy through governing statutes without judi-
cial oversight.10  Wielding this power to exclude and deport immi-
8. For a discussion of the pejorative connotation of the term and the far-reaching
implications of its usage, see, for example, Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the
U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 268 (1997) (“My hope is to illustrate how the term
alien masks the privilege of citizenship and helps to justify the legal status quo.
Similar to the social construction of race, which legitimizes racial subordination,
the construction of the alien has justified the fact that our legal system offers
noncitizens limited rights.”); Richard W. Painter, People Who Are Not Legal and
Who Are Not Alive in the Eyes of the Law, 59 VILL. L. REV. 667, 668 (2014) (noting
the ostracizing effect of the language surrounding alienage); D. Carolina Nun˜ez,
War of the Words: Aliens, Immigrants, Citizens, and the Language of Exclusion,
2013 BYU L. REV. 1517, 1551 (2013) (describing the metaphorical connotations
brought forth by the term “alien”).
9. Shockingly, even U.S. citizenship cannot protect a person from being detained by
ICE. See Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and De-
porting U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606 (2011) (describing in
detail and through case studies the rates at which ICE detains and deports U.S.
citizens, even though it has no jurisdiction over these citizens).
10. There is abundant literature about the extraordinary breadth of congressional
reach in immigration law and the ways in which this power affects other aspects
of law and policy. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the
Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 260–78; Ste-
phen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress,
and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925 (1995); Frank H. Wu, The Future of
the American Mosaic: Issues in American Immigration Reform, 7 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 35 (1996); Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Condi-
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grants since the earliest days of the federal immigration power,11 it
was a seemingly short leap for Congress to expand the INA to detain
immigrants.  In fact, Congress has solidified immigration officers’
power to detain immigrants pending their removal since the end of the
nineteenth century,12 bolstered by the U.S. Supreme Court’s approval
of the practice in the Cold War Era cases of United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy13 and Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei.14  In both cases, national security concerns about Communist
influences and espionage created an environment in which allegedly
suspicious immigrants could be held in government detention while
awaiting their deportation fate.15  Unconcerned with due process con-
siderations, both Ms. Knauff and Mr. Mezei were detained at Ellis Is-
land for several years without a hearing; the U.S. Supreme Court
famously declared in Knauff: “Whatever the procedure authorized by
tions of Confinement and the Porous Borders of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087 (1995).
11. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (upholding the
congressional power to exclude Chinese immigrants under the aptly named Chi-
nese Exclusion Act); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707, 713
(1893) (upholding the congressional power to deport noncitizens, including long-
term lawful permanent residents, as part of the Page Act, which further targeted
immigrants of Asian ancestry).
12. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 8, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085.  Ce´sar Cuauhte´moc Garcı´a
Herna´ndez has written about the history of detention through United States Su-
preme Court precedent and congressional mandate. See Ce´sar Cuauhte´moc Gar-
cı´a Herna´ndez, Invisible Spaces and Invisible Lives in Immigration Detention, 57
HOW. L.J. 869, 876 (2014) (asserting that immigration law pushes immigrants
out from the literal and metaphorical protections of the U.S. border, thereby
stripping them of due process protections and imprisoning them).
13. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
14. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
15. Ellen Knauff was born in Germany, became a refugee in England during World
War II, and ended up working for the U.S. War Department in Germany. See
Knauff, 338 U.S. at 539.  While in Germany, she met and married a U.S. citizen.
Id.  When she sought to enter the U.S. and join her husband, immigration offi-
cials detained her at Ellis Island and ordered her to be excluded and removed
from the United States based on secret evidence, the disclosure of which, the gov-
ernment argued, would be contrary to national security concerns. Id. at 540.  As
was later uncovered, the evidence implicating Ms. Knauff was shaky at best. See
Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the
Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 960–64 (1995)
(detailing the evidence against Ms. Knauff and her testimony and evidence in
defense).  Similarly, Mr. Mezei faced government allegations that he was an ac-
tive member of the Communist party and a communist sympathizer. See id. at
972–75.  Unlike Ms. Knauff’s case, though, Mr. Mezei also faced other exclusion
grounds based on his alleged claims of false citizenship and a conviction of petty
larceny, which is considered a crime of moral turpitude. Id. at 976.  Specifically,
he was convicted of receiving seven bags of stolen flour. Id.
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Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned.”16
Three years later, the Supreme Court upheld this fealty to the ple-
nary power doctrine in Mezei.17  Mr. Mezei, a Lawful Permanent Resi-
dent and long-term resident of the United States, was denied entry
back into the country after returning from Hungary.18  Because he
was unable to secure entry into several other countries despite his
best efforts and because the U.S. would not allow his entry based on
confidential evidence similar to that which plagued Ms. Knauff,19 he
languished on Ellis Island for approximately three years.20  Unmoved
by his plight and his inability to counter evidence that was not ini-
tially disclosed to him, the Court upheld his detention, citing Knauff21
and the panoply of plenary power precedent that sustains the broad
congressional powers to dictate immigration law and policy.22
Both Knauff and Mezei concerned the detention of immigrants
seeking admission to the United States.  Importantly, the power to de-
tain immigrants extends to those facing deportation and to those seek-
ing asylum protections.  The Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)23 expanded INA provi-
sions that allow and mandate immigrant detention at different
times.24  As codified, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
may apprehend and detain immigrants pending their removal deci-
16. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 544.  To be sure, the plenary power as recognized in Knauff
and Mezei retains its heft, and the decisions were recently invoked by the Obama
Administration in upholding the doctrine of consular non-reviewability in Kerry
v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (relying upon Knauff and Mezei in holding that
immigrants do not have a constitutional right to live in the United States with
their spouses).
17. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 216.
18. See id. at 208.
19. See id.
20. See Weisselberg, supra note 15, at 971–80 (detailing the history of Mr. Mezei
from his initial venture to Eastern Europe back to the United States, where he
was detained on Ellis Island until the conclusion of a protracted hearing process
in which he faced the government’s evidence used against him to exclude his
admission).
21. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 211.
22. Id. at 210.
23. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, Div. C (codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
24. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The Detention of Aliens, Theories, Rules and Discre-
tion, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 531, 533–34 (1999) (discussing the ways in
which IIRIRA and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of
1996 altered the landscape of immigrant detention); Ce´sar Cuauhte´moc Garcı´a
Herna´ndez, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1362
(2014) (acknowledging the importance of the 1996 legislation while asserting that
the history of expansive immigrant detention measures begins with American
efforts to criminalize illicit drug activity in the 1980s).  IIRIRA was passed in a
generally hostile political and social environment:
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sion by an immigration judge;25 and “shall take into custody” criminal
aliens26 and suspected terrorist aliens.27  The INA further provides an
expedited removal process whereby immigration officers can detain
arriving immigrants whom they suspect to have fraudulent or insuffi-
cient arrival documentation (e.g., a visa) without conducting a hear-
ing.28  This expedited removal mechanism and the concomitant
detention proviso apply even to those arriving immigrants who seek
asylum due to fear of persecution in their home countries.29
Indeed this provision is the backbone of ICE’s current practice of
detaining mothers and children fleeing violence in their home coun-
tries.  As DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson testified before the Senate Com-
mittee on Appropriations regarding adult immigrants who brought
their children with them: “Again, our message to this group is simple:
we will send you back.  We are building additional space to detain
IIRIRA came at a time of heightened anxiety and suspicion of immi-
grants and other marginalized communities, including the poor.  IIRIRA
was one of various new federal efforts aimed at decreasing undocu-
mented immigrants’ access to public benefits, which, in turn, sought to
decrease the number of undocumented immigrants in the United States
while also clearing the path to deporting other immigrants already in
the country.
Mariela Olivares, Battered by Law: The Political Subordination of Immigrant
Women, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 231, 246 (2014).
25. See INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012).
26. See id. § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).  The Board of Immigration Appeals has inter-
preted the term “custody” as it is used in INA § 236 to “refer[ ] to actual physical
restraint or confinement within a given space” and thus it is synonymous with
detention.  Matter of Aguilar-Aquino, 24 I&N Dec. 747, 752 (B.I.A. 2009); see also
Garcı´a Herna´ndez, supra note 24, at 1409 (discussing the ways in which the BIA
could change its interpretation).
27. See INA § 236A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
28. See id. § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2008); Legomsky, supra note
24, at 534.
29. See id. §§ 235(b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii),
1225(b)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii); Legomsky, supra note 24, at 534 & nn.14–15 (noting further
that the INA provision allows for detention of asylum applicants unless they can
prove a “credible fear” of persecution but stating that the INA still provides that
the government can continue to detain asylum seekers until such a standard has
been met (citing INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (“Any
alien subject to the procedures under this clause shall be detained pending a final
determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear,
until removed.”))); see also Nora Caplan-Bricker, Deported Without Seeing a
Judge: One of the Worst Parts of the Immigration System, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr.
14, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117355/expedited-removal-depor-
tations-immigrants-dont-get-due-process, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/3N89-
F44H (discussing ICE’s widespread reliance on the expedited removal procedure
for immigrants, including for those who may be eligible for asylum).  For a more
thorough discussion of the history of the INA detention provisions and the case
law surrounding immigrant detention, see Alina Das, Immigration Detention: In-
formation Gaps and Institutional Barriers to Reform, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137,
141–44 (2013).
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these groups and hold them until their expedited removal orders are
effectuated.”30  Secretary Johnson goes on to state that, even though
the immigrant women and children may have the right to seek asylum
or other relief, “within the confines of our laws, our values, and our
resources,” the “vast majority” of them will be removed to their home
countries.31  The official government message is thus clear: continued
detention of women and children fleeing violence and abuse in their
home countries is acceptable because they will be eventually removed
and because the practice serves as a deterrent to future migration.32
The detention of women and children immigrants pending their re-
moval hearings—which DHS apparently considers a mere perfunctory
step prior to certain removal33—serves as an important example for
analyzing the intersection between legislation and subordinated iden-
tity, which is more thoroughly explored in Part IV.  Unlike other pro-
visions of the INA that mandate detention of certain immigrants who
have entanglements with criminal consequences34 or prescribe deten-
30. Statement by Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson Before the Senate
Committee on Appropriations, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (JULY 10, 2014), HTTP://WWW
.DHS.GOV/NEWS/2014/07/10/STATEMENT-SECRETARY-HOMELAND-SECURITY-JEH-JOHN
SON-SENATE-COMMITTEE-APPROPRIATIONS [hereinafter Statement by Secretary
Johnson], archived at http://perma.unl.edu/YHN6-CETQ.
31. Id.  Advocates have noted, however, that immigration courts have approved
grants of asylum for detained women and children. See, e.g., Statement of the
Am. Immigrant Lawyers Ass’n submitted to the U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights
Briefing on “State of Civil Rights at Immigration Detention Facilities” (Jan. 30,
2015), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/YY7N-P6A5 (explaining a pro bono pro-
ject begun by the American Immigrant Lawyers Association (AILA) where attor-
neys represent detained women and children and have reported that most of
their clients should be eligible for asylum; indeed, project attorneys report that
they have won the majority of the cases they have presented before an immigra-
tion judge).
32. See R.I.L-R. v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164 (D.D.C. 2015) (holding that reliance
on a deterrence argument is not adequate grounds to continue to detain mothers
and children and to set high bonds for their release); see also Associated Press,
Lawyers: Detained Immigrant Families in Texas Offered Bonds, FOX NEWS (Mar.
1, 2015), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2015/03/01/detained-immigrant-
families-in-texas-being-offered-bonds-lawyers-say/, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/5K54-MGTD (noting a change in ICE practice after the R.I.L-R decision of
setting bonds for some of the families in detention at the Karnes City detention
facility, even though many bond amounts were as high as $7,500, an impossible
amount for the immigrants).
33. See Statement by Secretary Johnson, supra note 30 (“[U]nless the child has been
granted asylum or some other protection in this country—and the vast majority
will not—he or she will be sent back and we seek additional resources to do that
quickly.”).
34. See INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012).  As discussed in Part IV, the general
acceptance of detaining the “criminal” alien serves to sanitize the otherwise prob-
lematic detention of all immigrants, especially those who are awaiting a removal
hearing. See infra Part IV.  This perception of criminality that flows over all im-
migrants regardless of their actual criminal history perpetuates their further
subordination by public and private actors.  Further, and as others have ex-
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tion in certain cases after the immigrant has already received an im-
migration court order of removal,35 the detention of mothers and
children—just like thousands of other immigrants in other detention
facilities—occurs prior to any final removal adjudication and absent
any finding of criminal wrongdoing.  Moreover, unlike traditional
criminal courts in which loss of liberty is a possible consequence of an
adjudication of guilt, in immigration proceedings the immigrant who
is detained at the border—like the women and children migrants—
receives minimal, if any, due process protections and is not guaran-
teed legal representation.
The lack of procedural safeguards for immigrant detention is well
established.  The Supreme Court has upheld the power of the U.S.
government to detain immigrants pending their removal from the
United States after an adjudicative proceeding regarding their remov-
ability.36  Yet, the Court has also approved of governmental detention
of immigrants prior to the removability proceeding and ultimate deci-
sion,37 and the INA continues to provide for detention when the immi-
grant seeks asylum.38  Thus, at the point of detention—which can
plored, a defendant’s criminal conviction is, in many instances, a result of a
flawed criminal justice system. See, e.g., Reetu Mody, The Criminal Justice Sys-
tem Is Not Broken, It’s Doing Exactly What It’s Meant to Do, KENNEDY SCH.  REV.:
HARV. KENNEDY SCH. PUB. POL’Y J. (Dec. 5, 2014), http://harvardkennedyschoolre
view.com/the-criminal-justice-system-is-not-broken-its-doing-exactly-what-its-
meant-to-do/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/PEG4-2DLS (arguing the criminal
justice system has perpetuated oppression, as evidenced by the fact Blacks and
Latinos make up 58% of all prisoners but only 25% of the American population);
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (discussing the many ways in which the criminal justice
system skews towards imprisoning people of color); William Quigley, Racism: The
Crime in Criminal Justice, 13 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 417 (2012) (discussing the role
race plays in the criminal justice system, arguing that the biggest crime in the
US criminal justice system is that it is a race-based institution where Black peo-
ple are directly targeted and punished in a much more aggressive way than white
people).  This important topic regarding the general chronic problems in the crim-
inal justice system, however, is outside the scope of this Article.
35. INA § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) (2012).
36. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (upholding the detention of an immi-
grant pending his removal, though limiting the detention to a certain time
frame).
37. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005) (upholding detention of inadmissible
immigrants, though also with temporal limitations, per Zadvydas); Demore v.
Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (upholding the mandatory detention of immigrants
pending their removal determinations despite no finding of flight risk).
38. INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012); see also Bill Frelick, U.S. Detention of
Asylum Seekers: What’s the Problem? What’s the Solution?, 10 BIB 159 (Apr. 1,
2005) (discussing the discrepancies in ICE policy toward asylum seekers and
stating that the guidance to release aliens who meet their credible fear interview
is not evenly applied nor readily enforceable).
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constitutionally last for months39—the immigrant has not had any
type of formal proceeding that highlights her or his claim for immigra-
tion relief, including asylum.  And if, during this expedited removal
process, the immigration officer does not believe that an asylum appli-
cant has a good claim of credible fear, the person can remain detained
unless the applicant is granted a review of the determination by an
immigration judge.40  Although such detention does not fall under the
statutorily prescribed mandatory detention of a criminal alien41 in
which bond and release is not allowed, the common practice of ICE or
an immigration judge is to set an outrageously high bond, even for
asylum applicants, creating an insurmountable barrier for the immi-
grant’s release.42
B. A Snapshot of Detention
Having explored the history and the procedural limitations of im-
migrant detention, this Article now turns to more concrete realities
and, in particular, the incredible increase of detained immigrants in
recent decades.  In January 2014, Congress passed and President
Obama approved a fiscal year 2014 operating budget for DHS that al-
located $2,038,239,000 to “Custody Operations,” which amounts to im-
prisoning 34,000 immigrants each night.43  Just ten years prior in
2004, DHS operating budgets allocated funds for 18,000 detention
beds.44  In 1995, DHS detained approximately 85,730 immigrants to-
tal throughout the entire year.45  In 2013, by contrast, DHS detained
39. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 731 (holding that detention may not exceed a period
reasonably necessary to secure removal, and instructing adjudicative bodies to
measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the statute’s purpose of assuring
the alien’s presence at the moment of removal); see also Milton J. Valencia, US
Court Rulings Limit Detention of Immigrants, BOS. GLOBE (July 5, 2014), http://
www.bostonglobe.com/2014/07/04/immigrant/D9aOm3BDHnKRXP998gvPyI/
story.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/8ZVH-USBG (noting how two fed-
eral judges in Massachusetts limit detention of immigrants to six months).
40. INA § 235(b)(B)(iii)(III)–(IV), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(B)(iii)(III)–(IV) (2008); 8 C.F.R.
§ 235.3(b)(4)(ii) (2011) (“Pending the credible fear determination by an asylum
officer and any review of that determination by an immigration judge, the alien
shall be detained.”).
41. See INA § 236(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1).
42. See id. § 236(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (prescribing release conditions, including
setting a “bond of at least $1,500”); Associated Press, supra note 32.
43. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. F, tit. 2 (re-
quiring ICE to allocate funds to maintain a level of not less than 34,000 detention
bed through FY2014).
44. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-06-33, DETENTION
AND REMOVAL OF ILLEGAL ALIENS 5 tbl.1 (2006) [hereinafter DETENTION AND RE-
MOVAL], archived at http://perma.unl.edu/6L6K-HN6A (providing bed space num-
bers between 2002 and 2004).
45. See DORIS MEISSNER, DONALD M. KERWIN, MUZZAFAR CHISHTI & CLAIRE BER-
GERON, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED
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a total of 440,557 immigrants.46  The reasons given for the huge swell
in numbers of immigrants detained have varied, but, as detailed more
thoroughly below, many point to the legislative reforms beginning in
the 1980s and continuing through present day as a bellwether for in-
creased detention.47  As more immigrants fell under the expanded
statutory umbrella of discretionary or mandatory detention, the need
for increased detention facilities became critical.
In 2006, for example, at the peak in the numbers of immigrants
detained, a DHS Report decried insufficient funding for bed space and
for ICE personnel allocations as having led to large numbers of crimi-
nal aliens from countries “whose governments support state sponsored
terrorism (SST) or who promote, produce, or protect terrorist organi-
zations and their members (SIC)” being released rather than being
detained.48  The 2006 Report astutely predicted that to detain and re-
move all of these purported dangerous aliens—the SST, SIC and
aliens adjudicated guilty of crimes—ICE would need a congressional
allocation of approximately $1.1 billion to provide an additional
34,653 detention beds.49  By 2014, Congress responded to the call with
a $2 billion budget for 34,000 bed spaces.
Moving forward with filling these 34,000 beds, ICE confronted a
new challenge when, in 2014, thousands of women and children immi-
grants fleeing from violence in Central America entered the United
States without inspection.  By way of comparison, in fiscal year 2013,
CBP apprehended 21,553 unaccompanied children and 7,265 “family
units”—meaning, women and their child(ren)—along the South Texas
border with Mexico.50  In contrast, in 2014, CBP apprehended 49,959
unaccompanied children and 52,326 family units.51  The DHS re-
sponse to this influx of new immigrants was to call for an increase of
family detention units.52  DHS reported:
STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINE 11 (2013), archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/4MQP-TZ2S.
46. See JOHN F. SIMANSKI, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATS.,
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 6 tbl.5 (2013), archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/X4EJ-5ERZ.
47. See infra section III.B.
48. See DETENTION AND REMOVAL, supra note 44, at 2 (“Of the 605,210 [aliens other
than those from Mexico] apprehended between FY 2001 and the first six months
of FY 2005, 309,733 were released of which 45,008 (15%) purportedly originated
from SST and SIC countries.”).
49. See id.
50. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE ENFORCEMENT AND RE-
MOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 3 (2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/JQ6Z-
4PC8.
51. See id. at 2.
52. See id. (noting that unaccompanied children are not placed in detention but
rather turned over to local agencies of Health and Human Services for care and
guardianship; family units—i.e., mothers with their children—are placed in sep-
arate detention facilities, euphemistically called “family residential centers”).
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[The greater number of immigrants] requires ICE to maintain an increased
level of family detention space, which historically has been limited to fewer
than 100 beds nationwide.  ICE cannot detain family units, including chil-
dren, in adult detention facilities.  As a result, in the summer [2014] ICE
sought substantial resources and authority to build additional detention ca-
pacity to detain and remove family units, and since then ICE has opened or
expanded the use of three facilities for this purpose.53
Quick to respond to the demand, ICE—contracting with private
prison corporations Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and
GEO Group, Inc. in two instances and the Berks County, Penn-
sylvania county government in another—constructed or repurposed
3,700 bed spaces for family detention units by the first quarter of
2015.54  Euphemistically deemed “family residential centers” by DHS,
these detention units more closely resemble guarded prison facilities
than family-friendly bucolic retreats.  Lawyers and advocates repre-
senting the detained mothers and children in these centers—located
in Artesia, New Mexico; Karnes, Texas; Dilley, Texas; and Berks
County, Pennsylvania—have brought to light the prison-like condi-
tions that the mothers and children face.  For example, the Artesia
Residential Family Center—which DHS closed in December 2014,
transferring the detainees to the newly opened Karnes center—had
every appearance of a prison setting: “There is a barbed-wire fence
and a perimeter road that enclose the entire . . . facility.  There is a
secondary razor-wire fence interlaced with plastic slats the color of
sand that surrounds the detention center itself.  The plastic slats
made the detention center invisible.”55
Conditions within the facilities are equally dismal.  Lawyers for
the detainees have filed lawsuits and complaints against DHS and the
prison corporations, alleging inadequate medical treatment for the
women and children who have suffered the physical, mental, and emo-
tional effects of continued detention.56  Complaints against ICE’s
53. See id.; ICE’s New Family Detention in Dilley, Texas to Open in December, ICE
(Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ices-new-family-detention-cen
ter-dilley-texas-open-december, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/5HG6-FFMP.
54. See NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., THE DETENTION OF IMMIGRANT FAMILIES
(2015), archived at perma.unl.edu/TEE7-HRQM.
55. See Stephen Manning, Ending Artesia, INNOVATION LAW LAB, http://innova-
tionlawlab.org/the-artesia-report/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/AYNK-PNSU
(describing in great detail the history of the Artesia family detention center, con-
ditions for its detainees, and the efforts by lawyers and advocates to protest the
conditions); David McCabe, Administration to Close Immigration Detention
Center at Month’s End, THE HILL (Nov. 18, 2014), http://thehill.com/news/admin-
istration/224626-administration-to-close-immigrant-detention-center, archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/46JC-5LAM.
56. See Ed Pikington, Many Migrant Families Held by US Could Soon Be Free from
Detention ‘Nightmare,’ THE GUARDIAN (May 11, 2015), http://www.theguardian
.com/us-news/2015/may/11/undocumented-migrants-detention-held-texas-penn-
sylvania, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/L4DB-587V (describing investigative
reports regarding the family detention facility in Berks County, Pennsylvania,
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treatment of detainees in Karnes assert that women and children
have not been given adequate food; guards have harassed mothers for
not being able to quiet crying children; children do not have appropri-
ate access to educational and developmentally appropriate outlets;
mothers are forced to carry their infants constantly, rather than let
the children crawl or toddle; and guards sexually harass and sexually
abuse the women.57  Preliminary reports from the Dilley facility paint
an improved picture for detention conditions,58 though some activists
have raised similar concerns for the women and children, including
lack of access between lawyers and their detained clients59 and the
prolonged, unnecessary detention of their clients.60  Importantly, and
as discussed in Part III, this increase in the number of women and
children immigrants—and the increased detention facilities required
to house them—provide huge profits for the prison interests that build
and operate the units under government contract.
III. THE COMMODIFICATION OF IMMIGRANTS
Having established the legal, political, and societal origins of immi-
grant detention and provided a snapshot of the current practice of im-
including “allegations of poor medical treatment that saw sick children, including
a three-year old who was throwing up blood, being advised to ‘drink more
water’”); Lisa De Bode, Rights Groups Challenge DHS Policy Detaining Migrant
Women and Children, ALJAZEERA AM. (Feb. 3, 2015), http://america.aljazeera
.com/articles/2015/2/3/against-no-release-policy-of-central-american-asylum-seek
ers.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/34T3-V6GU.
57. See MALDEF letter to USCIS et al. (Sept. 25, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/23WD-W5H8 (describing the poor treatment of women and children de-
tained at Karnes); MALDEF letter to Jeh Johnson et al. (Sept. 30, 2014),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/W623-QF69 (describing sexual harassment and
abuse claims, among others, at the Karnes detention facility); see also Stephen
Dinan, Immigrant Rights Groups Sue Border Patrol Over Detention Facility Con-
ditions, WASH. TIMES (June 10, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2015/jun/10/border-patrol-sued-over-immigrant-detention-condit/, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/TP8P-GQ7X (describing how immigrant rights groups are
seeking relief in federal court regarding poor detention conditions).
58. See Julia Preston, Hope and Despair as Families Languish in Texas Immigration
Centers, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/15/us/
texas-detention-center-takes-toll-on-immigrants-languishing-there
.html?emc=eta1&_r=1, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/HT7C-RLZB (discussing
the amenities of the new Dilley facility, including medical and educational facili-
ties, and disputing reports that many children are not eating).
59. See Elise Foley, Immigration Attorneys Allege ICE Is Making It Tougher to Help
Women in Detention, HUFFINGTON POST (May 7, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2015/05/07/immigration-dilley_n_7225334.html, archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/VH79-55QB (noting the ICE procedures at Dilley, which prohibit law-
yers from using basic legal office supplies, like cell phones, printers and
scanners).
60. See Preston, supra note 58 (noting that some mothers and children have been
detained for six months or more).
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prisoning immigrants in Part II, Part III delves into the next critical
road at the intersection of the lucrative practice of immigrant deten-
tion.  It bears repeating that Congress controls just about every aspect
of immigration law, as evidenced by the statutes that provide for dis-
cretionary and mandatory detention of immigrants, largely with no
judicial oversight.61  Thus, this plenary power in drafting and imple-
menting the provisions affecting immigrants affords Congress monu-
mental and extraordinary command over immigration policies
regarding detention.  Further, as section III.A explores, the business
of imprisoning immigrants is extremely profitable.  Private prison cor-
porations and publicly funded prison entities quickly identified the
profit-making possibilities in light of these stricter criminal justice re-
forms, resulting in opportunities to imprison more people.  As section
III.B asserts, prison corporations profited from new laws that ex-
panded the type of immigrant conduct that would result in discretion-
ary or mandatory detention, leading to the detention of more
immigrants.  Most recently, the prison industry has generated incredi-
ble revenue by detaining women and children migrants.  This analysis
lays the groundwork for the discussion of the forces that permit this
commodification of people, which follows in Part IV.
A. The Prison Business
Scholars and activists have boldly and expertly told the story of the
genesis of the current system of mass incarceration.  Michelle Alexan-
der provides a framework for understanding how the current U.S.
carceral state—imprisoning over 2.3 million persons in local jails and
state and federal prisons at the end of 201362—owes its birth to the
politicization of anti-drug policy and both explicit and implicit
targeted efforts to criminalize and imprison people of color.63  andre´
61. See INA §§ 235(b)(B)(ii)–(iii), 236, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(B)(ii)–(iii), 1226 (2012); see
also supra Part II (discussing the INA provisions regarding detention of immi-
grants and regarding congressional plenary power over immigration law and pol-
icy).  Recent orders from the Executive that have extended deferred action
prosecutorial discretion to certain classes of immigrants are examples of immi-
gration policy and implementation that does not stem from congressional action.
See, e.g., Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The History of Prosecutorial Discretion in
Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1285 (2015) (outlining the history upholding
the legality of executive action granting prosecutorial discretion in immigration
law, including the 2014 Deferred Action for Parents of American and Lawful Per-
manent Residents (DAPA) program).
62. E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATS., BULLETIN:
PRISONERS IN 2013, at 1 (2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/9336-8KYL.
63. ALEXANDER, supra note 34, at 40–46 (discussing the origins of politically criminal-
izing black communities’ civil disobedience and protest during the Civil Rights
Movement, which morphed into a focus on targeting criminal activity).  Alexan-
der explores in great depth how this “tough on crime” narrative bore political
fruit beginning in the 1980s and continued through President Bill Clinton’s ad-
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douglas pond cummings outlines just how profitable mass incarcera-
tion of minority communities since the so-called “War on Drugs” has
been for the prison-industrial complex, with prison companies making
billions of dollars every year.64  Kevin R. Johnson highlights the
growth of the incarcerated population, noting that the anti-drug politi-
cal agenda to imprison more people affects a disproportionate percent-
age of people of color, though they do not represent a higher
percentage of perpetrators.65  Sociologists Lawrence D. Bobo and
Victor Thompson assert that the current system of mass incarceration
is a product of socioeconomic changes that exacerbated urban poverty
and a heightened reliance on incarceration as an answer to societal
ills, which were both fueled by intensified racist attitudes toward
Black communities.66  And as discussed below, the recent scholarly
and advocacy-focused conversation regarding the contours and
problems of and relationships between corporate profitability and im-
migrant detention has been rich and robust.67
The history of mass incarceration—meaning the veritable explo-
sion in the number of people imprisoned since the 1970s68—began
when public and political attitudes shifted to support legislative
ministration in the 1990s with pointed efforts to increase legislative criminal
penalties for non-violent drug offenses. See id. at 47–57.
64. andre´ douglas pond cummings, “All Eyez on Me”: America’s War on Drugs and the
Prison-Industrial Complex, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 417, 436–37 (2012) (not-
ing that, at bottom, the corporate system requires management to advocate for
maximized profits for its shareholders and that, in the private prison corporate
setting “management . . . must hope for, even work for, an increase in the number
of human beings being incarcerated in the United States.  Indeed this work has
been handsomely rewarded in recent years; reports issued in 2011 indicate that
the two largest private prison companies, CCA and GEO Group . . . together prof-
ited more than $2.9 billion in 2010.”).
65. Kevin R. Johnson, It’s the Economy, Stupid: The Hijacking of the Debate Over
Immigration Reform by Monsters, Ghosts, and Goblins (or the War on Drugs, War
on Terror, Narcoterrorists, Etc.), 13 CHAP. L. REV. 583, 590–91 (2010) (stating
that “[e]ven though the available statistical data suggests that whites, Latina/os,
Blacks, and Asian Americans have roughly similar rates of illicit drug use, the
‘war on drugs’ . . . has had devastating impacts on minority communities” in part
because law enforcement targets and racially profiles young African-American
and Latino men.).
66. Lawrence D. Bobo & Victor Thompson, Racialized Mass Incarceration: Poverty,
Prejudice and Punishment, in DOING RACE: 21 ESSAYS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 322
(Hazel R. Markus & Paula Moy eds., 2010).
67. See infra section III.B.
68. One definition of “mass imprisonment,” often synonymous with “mass incarcera-
tion,” was coined by David Garland: “A rate of imprisonment . . . that is markedly
above the historical and comparative norm for societies of this
type . . . [imprisonment] ceases to be the incarceration of individual offenders and
becomes the systematic imprisonment of whole groups of the population.”  David
Garland, Introduction: The Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, in MASS IMPRISON-
MENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1, 5–6 (David Garland ed., 2001).
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changes that categorized more conduct as criminal;69 increased the
carceral penalties of such conduct;70 lengthened sentences for various
crimes, including making imprisonment mandatory in some circum-
stances (e.g., “three strikes and you’re out” laws);71 and diverted fewer
people accused of crime away from sentences to programs that did not
involve jail time.72  Many have written about how this era of policies
and legislation implicitly targeted communities of color, especially af-
ter civil rights reform outlawed explicitly racist programs.73  In partic-
69. See, e.g., James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the
New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 59 (2012) (noting how the increase in prose-
cution and sentencing offenses for sex-related offenses has affected white people,
who are most often prosecuted and imprisoned for such offenses: “Prosecutions
for sexually explicit material offenses have risen by more than 400% since 1996.
In addition to the dramatic rise in the number of cases filed, the sentences im-
posed for all child-pornography related offenses have become increasingly severe,
rising from an average of 2.4 years in 1996 to almost 10 years in 2008.”).
70. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 34, at 109–11 (describing the effects of the fed-
eral law mandating enhanced sentencing for crack offenses in the case of Edward
Clary, a Black man who “was convicted in federal court and sentenced under fed-
eral laws that punish crack offenses one hundred times more severely than of-
fenses involving powdered cocaine.  A conviction for the sale of five hundred
grams of powder cocaine triggers a five-year mandatory sentence, while only five
grams of crack triggers the same sentence . . . . Because Clary had been caught
with more than fifty grams of crack (less than two ounces), the sentencing judge
believed he had no choice but to sentence him—an eighteen-year-old, first-time
offender—to a minimum of ten years in federal prison.”).
71. See, e.g., id. at 89–90 (criticizing mandatory sentencing law regimes: “Mandatory
sentencing laws are frequently justified as necessary to keep ‘violent criminals’
off the streets, yet these penalties are imposed most often against drug offenders
and those who are guilty of nonviolent crimes.  In fact, under three-strikes re-
gimes, such as the one in California, a ‘repeat offender’ could be someone who had
a single prior case decades ago.”); Bobo & Thompson, supra note 66, at 326
(“Mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines, three-strikes laws, various special
enhancements (i.e., selling drugs near a school), and truth in sentencing provi-
sions ensure that people convicted of crimes are not only more likely to end up in
prison but are there for much longer periods of time.”).
72. See, e.g., Forman, supra note 69, at 48 (noting that the state response to violent
crime is “less diversion and longer sentences”); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL PRETRIAL REPORTING PROGRAM (2012),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/N5X7-ZZBQ (showing that the median bail
amounts for prisoners who remained detained in large urban counties rose be-
tween 1990 and 2004 from $7,500 to $25,000). But see BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/M7JY-NFFT (showing that use of “community
supervision” programs such as parole and probation decreased the total number
of individuals in the American correctional system between 1985 and 2013 from
64% to 57%).  This trend towards rebooting diversionary programs in more recent
years has also had the effect of emphasizing immigrant detention and alternative
monitoring means as new sources of profit for the prison companies. See infra
section III.B and Part V.
73. Many have researched and documented this phenomenon.  For viewpoints from
some of the scholars who have recently written about it, see, for example, ALEX-
ANDER, supra note 34; Forman, supra note 69, at 60 (noting also the lack of atten-
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ular, the shift toward increasing the sentencing mandates for certain
drug-related crimes in the “War on Drugs” meant that arrests, prose-
cution, and prison sentences for crimes that previously had been con-
sidered minor now carried serious carceral penalties.74  Similarly,
politicians were wary of being perceived as “soft on crime,” and com-
munities also sought tougher laws that focused on putting away vio-
lent criminals.75  Thus, penalties for violent crime were strengthened
and fewer diversionary programs were employed.  This had a dispro-
portionally negative effect on young Black men, who were incarcer-
ated at higher rates than other populations.76  This result was in part
fueled by racially motivated law enforcement and legal strategies that
condoned racial and ethnic profiling at various stages in the criminal
justice system (e.g., at arrest, prosecutorial discretion at charging and
litigation, and at sentencing).77
The result of these successful movements to expand the role that
incarceration plays in the criminal justice system was a huge increase
in the number of people imprisoned.78  Indeed, for much of the twenti-
eth century, the number of people in jails and prisons stayed relatively
tion played by many advocates to the plight of Latina/os in the prison system:
“The Hispanic prison population climbed steadily during the 1990s, to the point
where one in six Hispanic males born today can expect to go to prison in their
lifetime.”); Bobo & Thompson, supra note 66; cummings, supra note 64.
74. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 34 at 52–94 (discussing the surge of drug crime
laws, sentencing enhancements and other carceral and civil penalties associated
with the War on Drugs); Ernest Drucker, Drug Law, Mass Incarceration, and
Public Health, 91 OR. L. REV. 1097, 1106–07 (2013) (noting the interconnected
history of the drug laws and the high rates of incarceration while also noting the
recent trends towards decriminalization in certain state laws and enforcement,
like California and other places where use of marijuana has been legalized).
75. See ALEXANDER, supra note 34, at 54–55 (describing the political environment
and rhetoric of the 1990s at the height of the movement: “Politicians of every
stripe competed with each other to win the votes of poor and working-class
whites, whose economic status was precarious, at best, and who felt threatened
by reforms . . . former allies of African Americans—as much as conservatives—
adopted a political strategy that required them to prove how ‘tough’ they could be
on ‘them,’ the dark-skinned pariahs.”); Forman, supra note 69, at 36–46 (discuss-
ing the calls from Black communities for tougher drug laws at about this same
time and asserting that, although incarcerations rates for drug crimes are high,
the majority of those incarcerated are there for violent crime prosecutions,
thereby arguing that a fuller picture of the mass incarceration phenomenon must
account for realities beyond drug crime).
76. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 34, at 96 (“In at least fifteen states, blacks are
admitted to prison on drug charges at a rate from twenty to fifty-seven times
greater than that of white men . . . in the mid-1980s, prison admissions for Afri-
can Americans skyrocketed, nearly quadrupling in three years, and then increas-
ing steadily until it reached in 2000 a level more than twenty-six times the level
in 1983.  The number of 2000 drug admissions for Latinos was twenty-two times
the number of 1983 admissions.”).
77. See, e.g., id. at 60–64.
78. See, e.g., Bobo & Thompson, supra note 66, at 324.
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stable—about 300,000 a year.79  Sociologists Bobo and Thomson re-
port that in 1980, which was near the end of a roughly fifty-year trend
of relatively consistent numbers of people incarcerated, there were
fewer than 300,000 people in prison.80  But in the mid-1980s, the
numbers began to jump dramatically in response to these targeted law
reforms.  Thus, by 2000, over 1 million people were imprisoned.81  By
2007, there were more than 2.3 million people incarcerated.82
Government agencies and law enforcement departments, at that
point, faced a dilemma: where could they house this surge of prison-
ers?83  The stable of prisons and jails were inadequate, and financial
resources to construct more prisons could not come fast enough.84  The
public construction and maintenance of prisons—by counties, states,
and the federal government—indeed flourished and continues to
house a large portion of imprisoned people and detained immigrants,
as has been historically true.85  But sensing a lucrative and timely
opportunity, private companies stepped in to fill the void left by the
insufficient publicly funded prisons.86  With promises to efficiently
and effectively build prison facilities quickly and at a significantly
lower cost for the government (local, state, or federal), these corpora-
79. See id. at 324–35 figs. 12.1, 12.2.
80. Id. at 324–25.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J.
437, 455 (2005) (tracing the “reemergence of private contractors in American cor-
rections . . . to the dramatic growth in incarceration nationwide over the past
three decades”); cummings, supra note 64, at 421–22, 436.
84. See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 83, at 455–56 (stating that, although initial re-
sponses to increases in incarceration rates were to ship prisoners to existing facil-
ities, government officials soon ran out of space and faced criticisms and lawsuits
due to mismanagement and overcrowding).
85. To be sure, prisons have a long history of state operation and control. See id. at
453–56 (discussing the emergence of privately run prison systems as the public
operations could not meet the increased demand); Philip L.  Torrey, Rethinking
Immigration’s Mandatory Detention Regime: Politics, Profit, and the Meaning of
“Custody,” 48 MICH. J. L. REFORM 101, 120 (2015) (“After World War I, prisons
eventually became public, non-profit institutions until the late 20th century’s
push for privatization and the prison population boom.  Laws passed in the 1920s
and 1930s explicitly barred prisons from engaging in profit-seeking activities.”).
The most recent report from the Bureau of Justice Statistics shows that “private
prisons held 7% of the total state prison population and 19% of the federal prison
population on December 31, 2013.” CARSON, supra note 62, at 13.  Thus, the vast
majority of prisoners in the general criminal justice prison system are held in
publicly run local, state, or federal prisons.  There is a higher reliance on private
prison operations in the immigration detention context, with roughly 50% of de-
tained held in publicly run detention in 2011.
86. See Dolovich, supra note 83, at 455–56; CODY MASON, THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE: PRIVATE PRISONS IN AMERICA 2 (Jan. 2012), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/QF5S-JPEC.
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tions entered the prison business.87  CCA was founded in 1983, and
although its founders had no correctional management experience, the
company’s leaders hired people with experience in the prison sys-
tem.88  The GEO Group—then known as the Wackenhut Corrections
Corporation—also entered the market at that time.89  As Susan
Dolovich writes: “Both CCA and Wackenhut were turning a profit by
the late 1980s, and by the mid-1990s, they together controlled 75 per-
cent of the American private prison market.”90
Indeed, the prison business has handsomely rewarded these com-
panies, their leaders, and shareholders.  In the first quarter of fiscal
year 2015, GEO Group’s earned revenue was $427.4 million dol-
lars91—or roughly $142.4 million dollars per month.  Similarly, in
that same time frame, CCA’s earned revenue was $426 million92—or
roughly $142 million dollars per month.  This money comes, in short,
from government contracts.93  In the immigration context, for exam-
ple, DHS contracts with the companies to construct, open, operate,
and maintain immigrant detention facilities.94  A recent report esti-
mates that, based on the 2014 congressional allocation of money to
DHS for immigrant detention practices, this amounts to $5.6 million
87. See Dolovich, supra note 83, at 458–59; Patrice A. Fulcher, Hustle and Flow:
Prison Privatization Fueling the Prison Industrial Complex, 51 WASHBURN L.J.
589, 598 (2012) (discussing how CCA began its carceral career by swiftly opening
its first immigrant detention facility pursuant to a contract with the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS)).
88. See Dolovich, supra note 83, at 459.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. See The GEO Group Reports First Quarter 2015 Results, GEO GROUP, INC. (Apr.
30, 2015), http://www.snl.com/irweblinkx/file.aspx?IID=4144107&FID=292424
85&printable=1, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/2DQU-X72Q.
92. See CCA Reports First Quarter 2015 Results, CCA (May 6, 2015), http://ir.correc
tionscorp.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=117983&p=irol-newsArticle_pf&ID=2044970,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/6KGS-J6ZB.
93. See, e.g., id. at 2 (noting the government contract with DHS to build family deten-
tion centers); Dolovich, supra note 83, at 455–62; Torrey, supra note 85, at
120–21; cummings, supra note 64, at 434–36 (discussing the various frameworks
that the government uses to enter into contracts with prison corporations and the
ways in which the companies ensure profits).
94. See Dolovich, supra note 83, at 457, 474 (discussing the incentives of the private
prison corporation in its government contracting with the state or federal enti-
ties); IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, CRIMINAL: HOW LOCKUP QUOTAS AND “LOW-CRIME
TAXES” GUARANTEE PROFITS FOR PRIVATE PRISON CORPORATIONS (2013), archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/4RHB-FSTM (discussing in depth about how private pris-
ons require contracts with government agencies that guarantee certain prison
occupancy rates, thus ensuring payment even if the prison beds remain empty).
Such quota contracts are linked to the congressional mandate of 34,000 beds for
detained immigrants and point to the incentive of criminalizing more activity to
fill the quota-required beds and contracts.
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dollars of taxpayer money a day,95 which corresponds to $164 a day
per imprisoned immigrant.96
It is not a leap of logic, then, to understand that the cheaper the
companies operate their detention facilities, the more money that they
make.97  Therefore, despite their promises of efficiency and humane
treatment of inmates and detainees,98 critics have long contended
that the companies instead provide inadequate and sometimes dan-
gerous conditions in their facilities.  Certain privately run facilities
have been accused practically since their inception of providing un-
secure facilities;99 not affording inmates and detainees sufficiently
safe living quarters, which leads to rampant violence, including physi-
cal assaults and murder;100 and denying inmates medical care, proper
food, and humane living conditions.101  Moreover, the promises of
95. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, THE MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION 2 (Aug.
22, 2013) [hereinafter MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION], archived at http://per
ma.unl.edu/6ZMP-LREP.
96. See id.
97. See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 83, at 460 (noting the profit-margin quandary: “If
the state is to reduce the cost of its prisons through contracting out to the private
sector, the contract price must be less than the total cost the state would other-
wise incur in operating the facility.  And if private providers are likewise to make
money on the venture, they must spend less to run the prisons than the contract
price provides.  For such arrangements to be remunerative for both parties,
therefore, private prisons must be run at a considerably lower cost than the state
would otherwise incur.”).
98. See, e.g., CORRECTIONS CORP. OF AM., CCA HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY STATEMENT 3
(2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/5YWD-DB3N (“Our facilities and opera-
tions are designed to ensure an appropriate standard of living [and to] maintain
safe, humane conditions.”).
99. See, e.g., Torrey, supra note 85, at 121 & n.127 (describing the first CCA-run
detention facility pursuant to a contract with the then INS in Houston where
some of the immigrant detainees escaped the facility by pushing air conditioning
units out of the windows; CCA had just leased an old motel building and deemed
it a detention facility).
100. See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 83, at 461 (describing the Youngstown, Ohio CCA-
run facility that in 1997—despite penal protocol and in order to save money—
housed maximum-security, high-risk inmates with prisoners from a medium-se-
curity facility, leading to forty-four assaults and two murders within the prison in
eighteen months).
101. See, e.g., Maunica Sthanki, Deconstructing Detention: Structural Impunity and
the Need for an Intervention, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 481–86 (2013) (detailing
the history of a detained immigrant who died from penile cancer due to gross
medical neglect while in detention); Torrey, supra note 85, at 122–23; Dolovich,
supra note 83, at 460–62.  The critiques against the private prison corporations
extend to their treatment of their own employees, who are often overworked and
underpaid so as to increase profits. See GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP & THE PUBLIC
SAFETY & JUSTICE CAMPAIGN, THE DIRTY THIRTY: NOTHING TO CELEBRATE ABOUT
30 YEARS OF CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA 4 (June 2013) [hereinafter
THE DIRTY THIRTY], archived at http://perma.unl.edu/R7GS-RSN2 (quoting
Joshua Miller of the public-sector union, AFSCME: “Private corrections is struc-
turally flawed.  The profit motive drastically changes the mission of corrections
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cost-savings also appear to be overstated, with some estimating that
the private prison-contracting scheme actually does not result in sig-
nificant savings to the government.102
Nevertheless, the private prison business flourishes: CCA and the
GEO Group reported combined revenues of $3 billion in 2011.103  To
be sure, public entities also reap huge financial profits through their
governmental contracts to maintain prison and detention facilities.104
To keep the profit margins high, then, the entities rely on a steady
stream of inmates and detainees.  And to ensure that steady stream,
state and federal legislation must continue to prioritize arrest, prose-
cution, and lengthy incarceration.
What happens, then, when this stream begins to dry up?  Indeed,
2007 was at about the zenith for incarceration rates, with almost 1.6
million people in federal or state prisons.105  As the Bureau of Justice
Statistics (BJS) reported, “During 2007, the prison population in-
creased more rapidly than the U.S. resident population.106  The im-
from public safety and rehabilitation to making a quick buck.  Chronic employee
turnover and understaffing, a high rate of violence, and extreme cost-cutting
make the private prison model a recipe for disaster.”).
102. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BANKING ON BONDAGE: PRIVATE PRISONS AND
MASS INCARCERATION 19 (Nov. 2, 2011), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/BD3F-
SCJV (noting that, while some evidence supports a view that private prison cor-
porations provide cost savings, “numerous other studies and reports have indi-
cated that private prisons do not save money, cannot be demonstrated to save
money in meaningful amounts, or may even cost more than governmentally oper-
ated prisons”).
103. See Paul Szoldra, Private Prisons Will Get Totally Slammed by Immigration Re-
form, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 2, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/a-3-billion-in-
dustry-is-going-to-be-slammed-by-immigration-reform-2013-1, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/A29K-7AXU.  The corrections business as a whole is incredibly lu-
crative, with estimates placing it at a $70-billion-a-year enterprise. See John W.
Whitehead, Jailing Americans for Profit: The Rise of the Prison Industrial Com-
plex, HUFFINGTON POST (June 10, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-w-
whitehead/prison-privatization_b_1414467.html, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/ZL8Y-53XX.
104. See, e.g., Anthony Orozco, Ford Turner & Nicole C. Brambila, Lawyers Seek Clo-
sure of Berks County Residential Center, READING EAGLE (Mar. 26, 2015), http://
readingeagle.com/news/article/lawyers-seek-closure-of-berks-county-residential-
center, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/6W39-DCFU (discussing the Berks
County Residential Center, the only publicly run family detention center cur-
rently operating, and quoting a Berks County Commissioner speaking about the
center: “This was an opportunity for Berks County to make profitable use of a
vacant building that was in relatively good shape . . . . It is amazing how well-
treated these people are given that they are here illegally.”).
105. CARSON, supra note 62, at 2 (showing that, although the peak of the prison incar-
cerations was in 2009, most of the momentum came from a steep rise in the
prison population in 2007).
106. HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUS-
TICE STATS. BULL., PRISONERS IN 2007 (2008), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
479F-MWCZ.
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prisonment rate—the number of sentenced prisoners per 100,000
residents—increased from 501 prisoners per 100,000 U.S. residents in
2006 to 506 prisoners per 100,000 U.S. residents in 2007.”107  But, as
the BJS has more recently reported, relative rates of incarceration
have since fallen.  In 2012, the U.S. prisoner population declined for
the third year in a row: “In 2012, the number of admissions [i.e., peo-
ple entering prison] (609,800) was the lowest since 1999, representing
a 9.2% decline (down 61,800 offenders) from 2011.”108  Albeit still an
incredibly high number of imprisoned people, the companies that
profit off of ever-higher rates of incarceration had to expand their fo-
cus on whom to target as inmates.109
As it turns out, finding the stream of new people to incarcerate was
easy—immigrants apprehended by ICE.  Indeed, CCA began its
carceral career by opening a facility for immigrants with the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS),110 the agency that preceded the
current immigration agency scheme under the DHS.  Recognizing im-
migration detention as an under-tapped font of possible revenue,
prison corporations turned their attention to capturing more of the im-
migrant detention business, resulting in even more profit.
B. The Prison Industry Discovers the Price of Immigrants
On May 6, 2015, CCA released its first quarter 2015 investor rela-
tions report.111  The profitability of imprisoning immigrants is clear:
In the first quarter of 2015, ICE continued housing female adults with chil-
dren arriving illegally on the Southwest border at the South Texas Family
Residential Center, a facility we lease in Dilley, Texas.  As of the end of the
first quarter of 2015, the facility had capacity to house up to 480 individuals
while ongoing construction will provide housing in 480-bed increments for up
to 2,400 individuals to be completed in the second quarter of 2015.  The new
107. Id.
108. E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATS., PRISONERS IN 2012: TRENDS IN ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, 1991–2012
(2013), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/FF6L-S4FT.
109. See, e.g., Geiza Vargas-Vargas, The Investment Opportunity in Mass Incarcera-
tion: A Black (Corrections) or Brown (Immigration) Play?, 48 CAL. W. L. REV. 351,
357–58 (2012) (arguing that the “source of profit for prisons . . . is the war on
drugs” but that the source has reached its optimal growth potential and thus,
“Prison companies cannot justify building new prisons on the basis of drug con-
victions.  However, prison companies can justify the building of new prisons
based on a whole new kind of prisoner: the illegal alien, and more specifically, the
‘Mexican.’”); see also Leslie Berestein, Detention Dollars: Tougher Immigration
Laws Turn the Ailing Private Prison Sector into a Revenue Maker, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIB. (May 4, 2008), http://www.utsandiego.com/uniontrib/20080504/
news_lz1b4dollars.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/4KCG-W2UF (discuss-
ing how the private prison corporations begin losing revenue in the early years of
2000 and sought new streams of profit by contracting with DHS).
110. See, e.g., Torrey, supra note 85, at 124.
111. CCA Reports First Quarter 2015 Financial Results, supra note 92.
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facility and services are being provided under amended Intergovernmental
Service Agreement (IGSA) . . . . During the first quarter of 2015, [CCA] recog-
nized $36.0 million in revenue associated with the amended IGSA.112
In short, CCA realized $8 million dollars in revenue each month for
the first quarter of 2015 just by imprisoning immigrant mothers and
children.
As discussed above, the general law reform movements that began
in the 1980s had the effect of increasing the number of people subject
to arrest and incarceration.  Similarly, immigration law reform at that
time expanded the types of conduct for which an immigrant could face
discretionary or mandatory detention and eventual deportation.  And
just as the motivations for general criminal law reform were the “War
on Drugs” and movements focused on arresting more people and giv-
ing them more severe prison sentences aimed ostensibly at cleaning
the streets and being tough on crime, the legislative provisions target-
ing immigrants largely intertwined drug use and abuse and general
criminality with immigrant status.113  More recent programs (post-
September 11, 2001) were billed as targeting potential terrorist
threats from within the immigrant communities, which eventually led
back to a more expansive scheme aimed at rooting out alien criminal
activity, in general.  This series of laws and programs set the stage for
the success of the prison industry in the immigrant detention
business.
As Ce´sar Cuauhte´moc Garcı´a Herna´ndez documents, between
1986 and 1994, Congress passed eight laws and resolutions that
stemmed from the “growing desire to fight drugs” and ultimately “set
the legislative groundwork for the expansive immigration detention
apparatus that exists today . . . .”114  As one important example, the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) of 1988 coined the term “aggravated fel-
ony,” which it defined to include murder, drug trafficking and illegal
112. Id.
113. The new legislative and regulatory regime, which increases the ways in which
immigrants are entrapped in the criminal justice system, is part of a broader
scheme of intertwining criminality with immigration even though there is noth-
ing inherently “criminal” about immigration law and policy, as Jennifer M.
Chaco´n asserts. See Jennifer Chaco´n, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 613 (2012).  Chaco´n notes that increased state and local-
ity encroachment into the immigration enforcement system, coupled with a
heightened federal enforcement, results in a hyper-criminalized environment for
immigrants. Id.
114. See Garcı´a Herna´ndez, supra note 24, at 1361 (discussing the series of laws that
serve as part of the genesis of the scheme of immigration detention: “[T]he Anti-
Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) of 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)
of 1986, the Refugee Assistance Extension Act of 1986, a 1986 joint congressional
resolution, the ADAA of 1988, the Crime Control Act of 1990, the Immigration
Act of 1990 (IMMACT 90), and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994.”).
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trafficking in firearms or explosive devices.115  An immigrant who is
convicted of an aggravated felony faces serious immigration conse-
quences, including mandatory detention and removal from the coun-
try, while being ineligible for most types of removal relief.116
The ADAA of 1988 was only one step in a quick series of laws that
resulted in a sudden increase in detention.  The Immigration Act of
1990 extended the definition of “aggravated felony” from the previ-
ously delineated three crimes to a more general category that included
crimes of violence with a sentence of at least five years.117  Then, in
1996, and along with the general political and societal anti-immigrant
and anti-poverty environment that ushered in other controversial
laws of the time, like welfare reform,118 Congress passed the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal Im-
migration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).  As one
of its goals, AEDPA amplified the use of mandatory detention for im-
migrants beyond those convicted of aggravated felonies and targeted,
among others, “noncitizens convicted of any controlled substances of-
fense, [and] those who used drugs [who] would also be subject to de-
tention without review by an immigration judge.”119  Moreover,
AEDPA added to the growing list of crimes that qualified as an aggra-
vated felony.120  Similarly, IIRIRA expanded the definition of “aggra-
vated felony” and mandated detention of huge categories of
immigrants accused of committing a broad array of crimes,121 includ-
115. Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat.
4181, 4469–70 (1988) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012)); see
also Yolanda Va´zquez, Constructing Crimmigration: Latino Subordination in a
“Post-Racial” World, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 600, 642 (2015) (discussing the history of
the ADAA of 1988).
116. ADAA of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7343(a)(4), 102 Stat. 4181, 4470 (amending
INA § 242(a), which mandates detention of certain immigrants with criminal con-
victions, including those convicted of aggravated felonies); Torrey, supra note 85,
at 114; Das, supra note 29, at 147; Garcı´a Herna´ndez, supra note 24, at 1370; see
generally Andrew David Kennedy, Expedited Injustice: The Problems Regarding
the Current Law of Expedited Removal of Aggravated Felons, 60 VAND. L. REV.
1847, 1848 (2007) (discussing the implications of a finding of aggravated felony).
117. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (1990);
see also Torrey, supra note 85, at 115 (describing the impact of the Immigration
Act of 1990).
118. See Olivares, supra note 24, at 246–47 (discussing the various federal efforts dur-
ing this time that targeted immigrants and other marginalized communities, in-
cluding the poor).
119. See Garcı´a Herna´ndez, supra note 24, at 1370 (citing AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, § 440(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1276–77 (1996) (amending INA § 242(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2))).
120. See AEDPA § 443.
121. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA) Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-627 (codified as
amended at 8 USC § 1101(a)(43) (1996)) (adding to the definition of “aggravated
felony“); Garcı´a Herna´ndez, supra note 24, at 1371.
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ing, for example, those convicted of multiple offenses of “crimes involv-
ing moral turpitude,”122 an immigration law term of art that attempts
to characterize a body of crimes amounting to “baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his
fellow men, or to society in general.”123  Further, and as discussed
above, IIRIRA codifies ICE’s power to detain immigrants pending
their removal decision by an immigration judge124 and allows for the
detention of arriving aliens whom CBP suspects of having a fraudu-
lent visa without a hearing.125  This expedited removal process even
extends to those arriving aliens seeking asylum protections.126
Since these 1996 laws, Congress has continued to grow INS’ (and
now DHS’) power to detain immigrants.  Significantly, after the Sep-
tember 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress ramped up its funding al-
locations with the goal of locating, detaining, and deporting suspected
terrorists.127  But from that time to about 2012, congressional focus
shifted from ostensibly rooting out terrorism threats back to a more
general plan of targeting broad ranges of criminal activity in the im-
migrant population.128  As a result, congressional funding schemes
centered on the apprehension, detention, and removal of more immi-
grants through such administrative programs as the 2003 Operation
Endgame, which included the Secure Communities initiative.129
Billed as a strategy to rid communities of criminal aliens, Secure Com-
munities instead created a foundation for local and state law enforce-
ment agencies to partner with federal immigration officials to profile
and target immigrants—including those accused of the most minor of
122. See IIRIRA § 303(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (1996) (adding to list of crimes leading to
mandatory detention); INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2008)
(“Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted of two or more crimes
involving moral turpitude . . . is deportable.”); see also Das, supra note 29, at 148
(“In 1996, Congress vastly expanded the types of removable offenses that trigger
mandatory detention to include offenses that were not per se bars to relief from
removal, like drug crimes and multiple ‘crimes involving moral turpitude.’”).
123. Marciano v. INS, 450 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 1971) (quoting Ng Sui Wing v.
United States, 46 F.2d 755, 756 (7th Cir. 1931)).
124. See INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
125. See id. § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2008); Legomsky, supra note
24, at 534.
126. See INA §§ 235(b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii),
1225(b)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii); Legomsky, supra note 24, at 534 & nn.14–15 (citing INA
§ 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV)) (further noting that the
INA provision allows for detention of asylum applicants unless they can prove a
“credible fear” of persecution and that the government can continue to detain
asylum seekers until such a standard has been met).
127. See Sthanki, supra note 101, at 453.
128. See id.
129. See id.
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offenses (like traffic violations) for their arrest and eventual
removal.130
As a result of this decades-long strategy amplifying the ways in
which immigrants could be detained, the number of immigrants sub-
ject to imprisonment and eventual deportation rose dramatically.
Just as the numbers of the general prison population began to swell in
the 1990s and reached all-time high numbers in the first decade of the
new millenium, the same trends occurred with the number of detained
immigrants.131  Moreover, IIRIRA added INA § 241(g)(2), which re-
quired (now) DHS to meet the increased demand for detention bed
space by first considering “for purchase or lease any existing prison,
jail, detention center, or other comparable facility suitable” for detain-
ing immigrants before constructing new bed space.132  Further,
IIRIRA also allowed the expenditure of INS budget allocations for ad-
ditional required bed space in INA § 241(g)(1), which approves of the
use of “amounts necessary to acquire land and to acquire, build, re-
model, repair and operate land and to acquire, build, remodel, repair
and operate facilities . . . necessary for detention.”133  Thus, in addi-
tion to the body of laws that greatly expanded the number of immi-
grants who fall under the detention regime, this statute created a
timely and lucrative opportunity for the private prison corporations by
requiring the government to access existing prison space, contract for
new space, or both.
130. See id. at 453–54; Johnson, supra note 65, at 596–600; Olivares, supra note 24, at
268.  Advocates and law enforcement agencies criticized the Secure Communities
initiatives, asserting that law enforcement targeting of immigrants actually led
to higher rates of crime against immigrants and less cooperation from their com-
munities in bringing perpetrators to justice, due to immigrants’ fear of eventual
apprehension by immigration authorities. See, e.g., Katarina Ramos, Criminaliz-
ing Race in the Name of Secure Communities, 48 CAL. W. L. REV. 317, 341 (2012)
(noting that although Secure Communities was ostensibly geared towards de-
porting violent criminals, it actually targeted any undocumented person in its
implementation, creating an atmosphere of fear in immigrant communities).  As
a result, many entities refused to participate in Secure Communities or work
with the federal immigration authorities. Id. at 326.  DHS terminated the Secure
Communities program in November 2014 and replaced it with the Priority En-
forcement Program (PEP), which “enables DHS to work with state and local law
enforcement to take custody of individuals who pose a danger to public safety
before those individuals are released into our communities.” See Office of En-
forcement and Removal Ops., Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), ICE (2015),
http://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Fact%20sheet/2015/
pep_brochure.pdf, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/89SS-GQYR.
131. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
132. INA § 241(g)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g)(2) (2006); see also Garcı´a Herna´ndez, supra
note 24, at 1371 (noting that this provision amounts to a governmental conces-
sion that detained immigrants can be rightly and “suitably” held in regular pris-
ons and jails while also facilitating “the growing reliance on private prison
corporations to meet the bed space needs of the INS and later, DHS”).
133. INA § 241(g)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g)(1).
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To be sure, one result of this increased emphasis on immigrant
criminality and reliance on detention through legislative measures is
a huge increase in the numbers of immigrants detained each year and
the numbers detained in private facilities.  By comparison: In 1995,
the federal government detained approximately 85,730 immi-
grants.134  Just eighteen years later in 2013, DHS detained 440,557
immigrants.135  Similarly, the role of privatized immigrant detention
has increased exponentially since its first foray into detention in 1984.
In fact, reports estimate that private prisons detain somewhere be-
tween roughly half to two-thirds of the total detained immigrant popu-
lation, making them a dominate force in the business.136  GEO Group
and CCA more than doubled their total revenues stemming from im-
migrant detention from 2005 to 2013.137  And when ICE increased its
apprehensions of mothers and children, both CCA and GEO Group
quickly jumped into the market by opening the “family residential
centers” in Karnes (GEO Group) and Dilley (CCA),138 thereby helping
to realize these enormous profits.
Thus, the political and societal movements to increase the
criminalization of immigrant conduct pursuant to the War on Drugs,
getting tough on crime, and the War against Terror were incredibly
successful catalysts in ramping up the detention machine.  Fueled by
this lucrative opportunity—which arrived at a time when the general
criminal justice scheme for increased incarceration was losing
steam—corporate prison interests astutely entered the immigrant de-
tention market to secure their critical participation in this new
money-making endeavor.  Now the relationship between immigrant
detention and profit-centered prisons is solidly built, but their symbi-
otic connection relies on an important component to maintain its foun-
dation.  As Part IV argues, this key element is the continued political
subordination of immigrants as perceived criminals, non-citizens, and
people of color.
134. See Meissner et al., supra note 45, at 11.
135. See SIMANSKI, supra note 46, at 6 & tbl.5.
136. Alex Tribou, Immigrant Detention Quota a Boon for Private Prisons, BLOOMBERG
BUS. (Feb. 24, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/infographics/2013-09-24/immi-
grant-detention-quota-a-boon-for-private-prisons.html, archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/W2M9-WB7S (reporting that nearly two-thirds of immigrants are de-
tained in “investor owned prisons”)
137. See Sasha Chavkin, Immigration Reform and Private Prison Cash, COLUM. JOUR-
NALISM REV. (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.cjr.org/united_states_project/key_sena
tors_on_immigration_get_campaign_cash_from_prison_companies.php, archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/H4CP-YF3J (documenting the exponential increases in
private prison corporate revenue and tying it to lobbying and campaign efforts).
138. See Whitehead, supra note 103 (noting the GEO center in Karnes); CCA First
Quarter 2015 Report, supra note 92 (noting the Dilley center).
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IV. AT THE CROSSROADS—INTERSECTIONALITY AT THE
PROFIT-DETENTION INTERSECTION
Understanding now the intersection between the history and prac-
tices of immigration detention and the influence of its corporate profit-
ability, this Part turns to the key ingredient for this practice to
succeed for so long with relatively little critique.  Indeed, the loudest
and most prevalent cries against immigrant detention practices have
arguably only been in response to the recent imprisonment of mothers
and children.139  That practice—it seems—may push even our pro-
carceral boundaries a bit too far.  Largely unknown by many, though,
the governmental practice of detaining immigrants has thrived for de-
cades, earning prison corporations billions of dollars.
The answer as to how such a practice succeeds lies in the next criti-
cal road at the intersection.  The intersectionality of subordinated im-
migrant identity makes the immigrant an easy target for legislation
designed to put more people in prison.  In short, the power to
subordinate becomes legislative fiat because “the immigrant” in the
United States occupies the most marginalized of identities—that of
perceived criminals, non-citizens, and persons of color.  This Part ex-
plores each of these identities and asserts that this intersectionality of
identity allows monied interests to benefit off the imprisonment of the
oppressed and to help perpetuate their continued incarceration.
A. The Immigrant Is a Criminal
Immigration and criminality have become inextricably linked to-
gether in public and political media and discourse.  Legislators from
both dominant political parties rely on the narrative of the criminal
alien to distance themselves from reform and advocacy that may seem
too soft on those who violate the immigration laws.  For example, re-
garding his stance on immigration reform, former Florida Governor
139. See, e.g., Letter from Congress of the United States, House of Representatives, to
Jeh Johnson, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (May 27, 2015), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/6PVY-GA6J (opposing family detention, as evidenced by the
signatures of 136 Democrats); Julia Preston, U.S. to Reduce Long Stays for Fami-
lies at Immigration Centers, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes
.com/2015/06/25/us/us-to-reduce-long-stays-for-families-at-immigration-centers
.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/9GHK-C28P (discussing ICE’s new proce-
dures to release women and children from detention after religious leaders, mi-
grant advocates, and 136 members of Congress and thirty-three senators called
for the end of family detention); Cindy Carcamo, U.S. Policy Change May Enable
Speedy Release of Detained Immigrant Families, L.A. TIMES (June 24, 2015, 7:18
PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-immigration-family-detention-
20150624-story.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/8HT3-B9ZY (discussing
Secretary Johnson’s move to release women and children who establish eligibility
for asylum or other relief under the laws after outcry over family detention and
reports of poor conditions).
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and 2016 Republican presidential candidate Jeb Bush proposes that
“once immigrants who entered illegally as adults plead guilty and pay
the applicable fines or perform community service, they should be-
come eligible to start the process to earn legal status.”140  Similarly, to
support his executive actions to provide deferred action to certain
groups of undocumented immigrants, President Obama has noted
that his immigration policies are about targeting “felons, not families.
Criminals, not children.  Gang members, not a mom who’s working
hard to provide for her kids.”141
Both statements support a view of immigrants as criminal law-
breakers, or at least potential lawbreakers.  While President Obama’s
emphasis on immigrants’ criminality or latent criminality is powerful
enough, others cast a criminal character on simply the act of being an
undocumented immigrant.  Bush’s perspective that, before securing
any type of relief, immigrants must “plead guilty”—though immigra-
tion violations are only civil law and do not lead to any assessment of
one’s guilt—is typical rhetoric that confuses criminality with immi-
grant status.  And President Obama’s assertion that some immigrants
are worthy while others are not solidifies the narrative that it is easy
for the immigration system to pick and choose among the best, bright-
est, hardest working, or least culpable of people, when, in reality, the
lives of immigrants (like everyone) often involve ambiguities and com-
plications.142  Moreover, both types of statements contribute to the
popular perception that typecasts immigrants as rule-breakers, who
are thus rightly subject to prison detention.
140. Alex Altman, Republican Candidates Dodge Immigration Questions, TIME (May
17, 2015), http://time.com/3867523/immigration-republican-presidential/,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/6TW8-H3SC (quoting answers from Jeb Bush’s
spokesperson from a survey regarding immigration reform given to the 2016 Re-
publican presidential candidates).
141. President Barack Obama, Address to the Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/F2YB-8777.  President Obama has otherwise
spoken in terms of “good” versus “bad” immigrants. See Ginger Thompson & Sa-
rah Cohen, More Deportations Follow Minor Crimes, Records Show, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/more-deportations-follow-
minor-crimes-data-shows.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/2RRQ-
M7D7 (discussing the high number of deportations in the years of the Obama
Administration, and stating that though President Obama claims to be deporting
criminals, gang members, and other criminals, that is not actually the case).
142. See, e.g., Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the Need
for New Narratives in the U.S.  Immigration System, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207,
221–22 (2012) (describing how the narrative of criminality and victimhood bene-
fits certain immigrants (the perceived victims) and inordinately targets others
(the perceived criminals) without suitable discretion for complexities); Mariela
Olivares, Renewing the Dream: DREAM Act Redux and Immigration Reform, 16
HARVARD LATINO L. REV. 79, 89–98 (2013) (asserting that advocates for DREAM
Act-type legislation historically fell victim to the problems inherent in the narra-
tive dilemma of good versus bad immigrant).
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In fact, the reality does not match the perception.  Research has
routinely shown that immigrants do not commit crime at a higher rate
than U.S. citizens,143 bucking the myth that status as an immigrant
somehow correlates to a criminal nature or propensity.  Moreover,
many immigrants held in detention do not have criminal records or
records for non-violent infractions, such as misdemeanors or drug-re-
lated crimes.  ICE’s own statistical data shows that in 2014, only 56%
of the immigrants it removed from the United States had criminal
convictions.144  Of those eventually removed who were apprehended
at a border entry (like, for example, the mothers and children who
were caught while entering at the Mexico-U.S. border) and not in the
interior, 89% had no criminal record.145  Although these numbers re-
flect those immigrants deported and not necessarily those in deten-
tion, they are an important reflection of those held in detention.146
143. See WALTER A. EWING, DANIEL E. MARTI´NEZ & RUBE´N G. RUMBAUT, AM. IMMIGR.
COUNCIL, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2015),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/8253-HYP2 (surveying the data and showing:
“[E]vidence that immigrants tend not to be criminals is overwhelming. . . . Crime
rates in the United States have trended downward for many years at the same
time that the number of immigrants has grown.  Second, immigrants are less
likely to be incarcerated than the native-born.  And, third, immigrants are less
likely than the native-born to engage in criminal behaviors that tend to land one
in prison.”); see also Ce´sar Cuauhte´moc Garcı´a Herna´ndez, The Perverse Logic of
Immigration Detention: Unraveling the Rationality of Imprisoning Immigrants
Based on Markers of Race and Class Otherness, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 353, 362
(2012) (citing Ramiro Martı´nez, Jr., Coming to America: The Impact of the New
Immigration on Crime, in IMMIGRATION AND CRIME: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND VIO-
LENCE 1, 10–12 (Ramiro Martı´nez, Jr. & Abel Valenzuela, Jr. eds., 2006)) (noting
evidence indicating that immigrants are actually less prone to criminal behavior
than U.S. citizens); Johnson, supra note 65, at 592 (same) (citing KEVIN R. JOHN-
SON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS
AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 155–58 (2007)).
144. ICE, ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2014, at
7 (2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/T8SA-FC7N.
145. Id.; see also MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION, supra note 95, at 5 (discussing
earlier detention data: “From 1996 to 2006, 65 percent of immigrants who were
detained and deported were detained after being arrested for non-violent crimes.
Between 2009 and 2011, over half of all immigrant detainees had no criminal
records.  Of those with any criminal history, nearly 20 percent were merely for
traffic offenses.”).
146. As Juliet Stumpf asserts, the rise of mass detention is a corollary to the rise in
increased deportations:
Greater numbers of detainees will result in greater numbers of deporta-
tions.  Like any system with inputs and outputs, a non-citizen in deten-
tion puts pressure on the system to move that non-citizen through the
outcome of the removal decision.  That pressure comes either from legal
limitations on detention periods, from practical reasons such as limita-
tions on detention space or simply because detention is upriver from
deportation.
Juliet P. Stumpf, Crimmigration, Surveillance and “Security Threats”: A Mul-
tidisciplinary Dialogue, 40 QUEEN’S L.J. 55, 96 (2014).
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Indeed, a 2009 Associated Press study indicates that 58.4% of immi-
grants held in detention on one studied day had no criminal record at
all.147  This data was again confirmed in a 2014 study,148 thus effec-
tively countering the myth that imprisonment equals criminality.
Moreover, the complexities of criminality are not always easily dis-
cernible in statistics.  In its most recent fiscal year (2014) report, ICE
details the types of detainees who had criminal convictions and were
deported.  The ICE data categorizes them as “Level 1,” “Level 2,” or
“Level 3,”149 which correspond to the priority level of their removal
from the U.S.—the higher the “level,” the higher the priority for re-
moval.150  In this case, the Level 1 offenders are considered the high-
est priority for removal.151  A review of the most recent ICE National
Detention Standards, which ostensibly govern the operations of its de-
tention facilities, is illustrative in understanding what these level-
based categorizations and priorities mean.  In fact, of the three levels,
only Level 1 includes immigrants that have been convicted of some
type of violent crime.152  In 2014, Level 1 offenders amounted to a
mere 6.1% of all immigrants detained and deported.153  As another
example, ICE boasts that, in 2014, it detained and deported 2,802 im-
migrants who were “suspected or confirmed gang members,”154 which
out of the 315,943 immigrants detained and deported that year,
147. See Michelle Roberts, Most Immigrants in Detention Did Not Have Criminal Re-
cord, Reports AP, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2009/03/15/most-immigrants-in-detent_n_175118.html, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/QXS2-KUJH; see also Chaco´n, supra note 113, at 633 (noting the
discrepancies regarding detention rates for different types of alleged criminal ac-
tivity: “Strikingly, although 81% of those charged with drug-trafficking offenses
are detained after arrest and 87% of those charged with violent crimes are de-
tained after arrest, a full 95% of those who have committed immigration crimes
(which are largely nonviolent and most often misdemeanors) are detained upon
arrest.”).
148. See Thompson & Cohen, supra note 141 (analyzing data in 2014 showing that
two-thirds of immigrants deported from the U.S. since 2008 committed minor
traffic violations or had no criminal record at all).
149. See ICE ENFORCEMENT REPORT 2014, supra note 50, at 8.
150. See ICE, ICE PERFORMANCE-BASED NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS 2011, at 75
(2011) [hereinafter ICE NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS 2011], archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/5TBV-7JK6; Memorandum from John Morton, Director,
ICE, to All Field Office Directors, Special Agents in Charge, and Chief Counsel,
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration En-
forcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal
of Aliens, 2 (June 17, 2011), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/FAG9-4GRH.
151. See ICE ENFORCEMENT REPORT 2014, supra note 50, at 9–11.
152. See ICE NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS 2011, supra note 150, at 75 (stating
that detainees classified in the low or medium custody classifications may have a
history of violence); see also Garcı´a Herna´ndez, supra note 24, at 1412–13 (argu-
ing that the classification system should serve as guidance in keeping those im-
migrants deemed low and medium-risk out of detention).
153. See ICE ENFORCEMENT REPORT 2014, supra note 50, at 7–8.
154. Id. at 7.
2016] IMMIGRATION DETENTION 995
equals 0.9% of the total.155  This point is made not to argue that re-
moving violent criminals is generally bad policy, but rather that ICE
uses the worst of the criminal narrative trope in an attempt to support
its claims that it is targeting the highest priority criminals for deten-
tion and removal, when the reality is that most detained immigrants
actually have no criminal record.
This powerful narrative of “the immigrant is a criminal” lives
throughout immigration law and policy.  For example, the criminal
alien identity in many ways mirrors the exclusionary framework of
the INA.  The INA deems numerous categories of immigrants inad-
missible into the United States for having perceived negative or un-
worthy characteristics—such as being ostensibly financially unable to
care for oneself without assistance156 or having certain physical or
mental disabilities.157  And indeed the INA outlaws the admission of
some immigrants with criminal records158 and prioritizes the deporta-
tion of criminals.159
But beyond the explicit statutory framework, the identity of the
immigrant as a criminal colors the ways in which law and policy affect
even those who have clean criminal records and serves to ease the
path for their detention.  For example, there is a popular perception
that immigrants who are present without authorization in the United
States are evading immigration law and have broken the law by enter-
ing.160  Yet, as is the often the case with overarching conclusory depic-
155. See id. at 7–8.
156. INA § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(4) (2013).
157. Id. § 212(a)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii).
158. Id. § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Va´zquez, supra note 115, at 635 (discussing the history of Latina/o im-
migrants’ migration to the United States and noting that in the anti-immigrant
era of the Immigration Relief and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986: “Unauthorized im-
migrants’ presence in the United States was again perceived as a danger to
American society, its well-being and safety.  Their increasing numbers were cor-
related to an ‘invasion by aliens.’  This time, however, unauthorized immigrants
began to be viewed as ‘criminals’ and socially deviant, based on their act of unau-
thorized crossing and their perceived propensity towards future criminal activ-
ity.”).  Moreover, the perception of wrongdoing by mere presence underscores the
striations of criminality—and on its other side, virtuousness—that persist in im-
migration laws.  Obama’s executive actions, for example, differentiate between
those who have been here for a longer amount of time—and, thus, supposedly
have more ties to the country or for whom removal would be a bigger hardship—
than those immigrants who recently arrived. See, e.g., Wadhia, supra note 61, at
1286–89 (discussing the provisions of President Obama’s 2012 and 2014 execu-
tive actions, which gave deferred action status to certain minors and parents of
minors who satisfy eligibility requirements, including continued U.S. presence,
not having criminal records, and not otherwise falling into any category of immi-
grants who are priorities for removal); Hylton, supra note 1, at 3 (indicating that,
though President Obama has been progressive in providing relief to certain im-
migrants, “the president’s new policies apply only to immigrants who have been
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tions, the conflation of an undocumented immigrant—who may have
committed a civil violation by entering without proper authorization—
with a criminal—who ostensibly was adjudicated guilty of a crime—is
incomplete.161
Importantly, it is not just perceived criminal status that fueled the
increase of immigrant detention.  As discussed above, the historical
conflux of mass incarceration, generally, and expansion of immigra-
tion detention practices, specifically, led in part to the current state of
detention.  As Garcı´a Herna´ndez writes, the huge increase in immi-
gration imprisonment and penal incarceration was “no coinci-
dence.”162  He notes that initial steps toward mandatory immigrant
detention targeted Haitians and Cubans, two nationalities who “were
linked in the public imagination to crime and illegality.”163  Moreover,
the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, buoyed this perception,
heightening the long-held historical conflation of immigrant identity
with terror threat.164  Indeed, of the long list of prohibited characteris-
tics and conduct in the INA, posing a threat to national security is one
of the most severe categories.  From the earliest days of formalized
immigration law that excluded Chinese people based on the power to
protect the country from any threat, be it “from the foreign nation act-
ing in its national character or from the vast hordes of people crowd-
ing in upon us,”165 U.S. immigration law and policy have marked
those immigrants perceived to be a security threat.  Just like the law
accused Mr. Mezei and Ms. Knauff of communist activities a genera-
tion ago,166 post-September 11 legislation concentrated on national
in the United States for more than five years; they do nothing to address the
emerging crisis on the border today”).
161. See, e.g., Va´zquez, supra note 115, at 635; Keyes, supra note 142, at 217–18 (com-
menting on the power of the narrative of criminal immigrant: “[T]his narrative
equates immigrants with criminals, and it does not distinguish between those
who commit the civil violation of being present in the U.S. without inspection and
those who commit crimes once present . . . mainstream politicians and fringe hate
groups alike define the act of living day-to-day as an undocumented immigrant as
an illegal enterprise.”).
162. Garcı´a Herna´ndez, supra note 24, at 1375.
163. Id. at 1375–76.
164. See Johnson, supra note 65, at 597–98 (discussing more recent campaigns against
immigrants accused of participating in terror activities); Juliet P. Stumpf, The
Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L.
REV. 367, 385 (2006) (“The national focus on terrorism has also had the effect of
connecting criminal and immigration law.  After the events of September 11,
anti-terrorism efforts employed both immigration control and criminal law to re-
duce terrorist threats.”); Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, The Immigra-
tion Reform Act, and Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important
Lessons for Citizens and Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 833 (1997) (detailing the
history of INA prohibitions against perceived national security threats).
165. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
166. See supra Part II.
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security concerns and, among other things, broadened the INA defini-
tion of “terrorist activity,” a finding of which could lead to the exclu-
sion, detention, or removal of immigrants.167  Thus, through this
history and focus, the imprisonment of immigrants essentially fulfills
an understood depiction of immigrants as criminals.
This perception has been especially strong in response to the
mother and children migrants entering the southern U.S. border.
Public and political outcry labels immigrants as criminal lawbreakers
who will steal free education,168 public benefits and healthcare,169
and infest schools and public spaces with disease.170  In one now infa-
mous 2014 protest, people gathered to shout at buses of immigrant
mothers and children who were being transported to a detention facil-
ity with cries of: “Nobody wants you.  You’re not welcome.  Go
home.”171  Even the initial depictions from the Obama Administration
of the immigrants evinced a perspective that the mothers and children
were lawbreakers with no viable claims for immigration relief and
would face expeditious deportation.172  Yet, initial interviews and re-
ports indicate that at least some of them have legitimate claims for
asylum due to their credible fear of persecution should they return to
their home countries, including horrific tales of domestic violence, sex-
167. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act),
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections in numer-
ous titles of U.S.C.); Johnson, supra note 65, at 596–98 n.79.
168. See, e.g., Katie Pavlich, Schools to Be Flooded with Illegal Immigrant Children,
TOWNHALL.COM (Aug. 12, 2014), http://townhall.com/tipsheet/katiepavlich/2014/
08/12/schools-to-be-flooded-with-illegal-immigrant-children-n1877702, archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/4W67-ZSZ9 (“Good news America, tens-of-thousands of
children in the country illegally are on their way to a public school near you for a
taxpayer funded education and the Department of Education says they’re enti-
tled it.”).
169. See, e.g., Melanie Batley, Poll: Most Oppose Legal Rights, Benefits for Illegal Im-
migrants, NEWSMAX (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.newsmax.com/US/Illegal-immi-
grants-legal-rights-government-benefits-Americans/2014/10/01/id/597981/,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/2M5L-AQ53 (noting that 71% of polled Ameri-
cans believe that undocumented immigrants should not have access to govern-
ment benefits).
170. See, e.g., Illegal Alien Minors Spreading TB, Dengue, Swine Flu, JUDICIAL WATCH
(July 3, 2014), http://www.judicialwatch.org/blog/2014/07/illegal-alien-minors-
spreading-tb-ebola-dengue-swine-flu/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/GEA2-
AFYX (“The hordes of illegal immigrant minors entering the U.S. are bringing
serious diseases—including swine flu, dengue fever, possibly Ebola virus and tu-
berculosis—that present a danger to the American public as well as the Border
Patrol agents forced to care for the kids, according to a U.S. Congressman who is
also a medical doctor.”).
171. See Esther Yu-Hsi Lee, Protesters Hound Buses of Immigrant Children: ‘Nobody
Wants You,’ THINK PROGRESS (July 2, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/immigra-
tion/2014/07/02/3455678/protesters-block-families-children-buses/, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/C2Y5-5K9C.
172. See Statement by Secretary Johnson, supra note 30.
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ual abuse and assault, and gang violence and intimidation.173  Prelim-
inary data on the immigration cases for the mothers and children
immigrants in 2014 indicate that, when represented by a lawyer,
roughly 26% of the cases that went before an immigration official suc-
cessfully gained some form of relief.174  By comparison, another 2014
study showed that approximately 73% of the unaccompanied children
immigrants (as opposed to those travelling with their parent) who had
legal representation were permitted to stay in the United States.175
Moreover, a recent report by the House Judiciary Committee shows
asylum applications from minors have an approval rate of 65%.176
Thus, the perception that detained mothers and children are law-
breakers without any claim to lawful immigration status does not hold
true.
Moreover, in contrast to the general ICE Detention Standards,177
the most recent version of the ICE “Family Residential” Standards for
detention (2007) does not have any categorization system for criminal
offenders,178 thereby acknowledging that ICE does not view detained
mothers and children as convicted criminals who are high removal
priorities.179  Yet, many mothers and children—regardless of the
173. See, e.g., Family Detention Asylum Case Examples, AM. IMMIGR. LAW. ASSOC.
(May 13, 2015), http://www.aila.org/infonet/family-detention-asylum-grant-exam-
ples, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/QXX8-3M5D (detailing relevant stories of
some of the case victories litigated by the American Immigration Lawyers Associ-
ation (AILA) pro bono project on behalf of clients detained in Artesia in which
lawyers have won seventeen of the twenty-two asylum cases).
174. In one early analysis of the data, individuals who were not represented by coun-
sel were ordered deported 98.5% of the time; only 1.5% were granted immigration
relief. See Representation Is Key in Immigration Proceedings Involving Women
and Children, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Feb. 18, 2015), http://trac.syr.edu/immigra-
tion/reports/377/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/3A39-YN3Z.  In contrast, if
the immigrants had counsel, they achieved relief in 26.3% of the cases. Id.
Among these 26.3% of cases, “relief was ordered more than twice as often as the
immigration judge ruled the government failed to demonstrate a legal basis to
order removal.” Id. As the report cautions, however, the data is very preliminary
and may not be indicative of larger trends. Id. Further, because immigration
cases may take years to wend through the immigration system, it is not yet possi-
ble to gauge the success rates on a large scale.
175. See Representation for Unaccompanied Children in Immigration Court, TRAC IM-
MIGRATION (Nov. 25, 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/371/, archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/5P57-7ZVX.
176. See H.R. JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 113TH CONG., JUDICIARY OBTAINS DATA SHOWING
MAJORITY OF CENTRAL AMERICANS’ ASYLUM CLAIMS IMMEDIATELY APPROVED
(2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/7ZNH-AM7P.
177. See supra note 150.
178. See ICE Family Residential Standards, ICE (2007), http://www.ice.gov/detention-
standards/family-residential (last visited Feb. 16, 2016), archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/365U-KEPC (providing links to the manuals, which include no custody
categorizations based on security, threat, or criminality).
179. DHS has argued, instead, that employing family detention is a deterrent mecha-
nism for future migration, citing In re D-J, 23 I&N Dec. 572 (A.G. 2003). See, e.g.,
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strength of an eventual case for immigration relief and the lack of any
criminal record—remain imprisoned for many months in detention
centers.180
Indeed, the vulnerability of the imprisoned mothers and children
presents an important example of the parallel between immigrant de-
tention and the more general scheme of mass incarceration in the
United States.  At their origins, both practices intend to criminalize
certain communities.181  And both practices have succeeded through
various means: campaigns implicitly targeting some combination of
Blacks, Latina/os and immigrants for societal ills;182 hyped rhetoric
regarding the “wars” on terror and drugs, which in part serve as mere
euphemisms for racial, ethnic, immigration-status, and religious pro-
filing;183 and the proliferation of legal authority and law enforcement
Ending the Use of Immigration Detention to Deter Migration, DETENTION WATCH
NETWORK (Apr. 2015), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/TJQ7-H3RP.  This ratio-
nale was criticized by a D.C. District Court in R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d
164 (D.D.C. 2015), in which the Court granted an injunction against the contin-
ued detention of families.
180. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 1 (presenting cases of women and children facing
long detention); MIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVS./U.S. CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISH-
OPS, DEMANDING DIGNITY: THE CALL TO END FAMILY DETENTION (2015) [hereinaf-
ter DEMANDING DIGNITY], archived at http://perma.unl.edu/SY78-DB22
(discussing same).  Bowing to bipartisan political pressure and a loud public out-
cry, in June 2015, the Obama Administration announced that it would no longer
seek to hold the mothers and children in detention for long periods of time, opting
instead to release them to family members in the U.S. and instead rely on other
monitoring methods to ensure their presence at later immigration court proceed-
ings. See Preston, supra note 139.  In January 2016, ICE announced that it
would employ a program for detention alternatives for families that otherwise
would have been detained. See ICE, FACT SHEET: STAKEHOLDER REFERRALS FOR
THE ICE/ERO FAMILY CASE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (updated Jan. 8, 2016),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/76V7-VYC5 (describing the Family Case Man-
agement Program (FCMP) that will be implemented on January 21, 2016, and
utilize “qualified case managers to promote participant compliance with their im-
migration obligations”).
181. See discussion supra section III.A (regarding general criminal law statutes focus-
ing on the imprisonment of the Black community post-Civil Rights Movement);
section III.B (regarding the history and political practice of immigrant detention).
182. See supra Part III (regarding the history of mass incarceration); ALEXANDER,
supra note 34, at 43–46 (discussing the strategies of early campaigns to
strengthen the criminal law by vilifying communities of color, including Nixon’s
famous clandestine remark during his 1968 campaign: “ ‘It’s all about those damn
Negro-Puerto-Rican groups out there.’”); section IV.A (discussing the powerful
rhetoric that criminalizes immigrants and blames them for societal problems).
183. See supra Part III (regarding the War on Drugs and how it led to increased incar-
ceration rates and more detention of immigrants); see also Sahar F. Aziz, From
the Oppressed to the Terrorist: Muslim-American Women in the Crosshairs of In-
tersectionality, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 191, 202 (2012) (discussing the
targeting of Muslim people after the September 11 attacks: “The September 11th
terrorist attacks recast Islam as a hostile political ideology, as opposed to a bona
fide religion.  As a result, what would otherwise qualify as ‘religiously driven ra-
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practices that result in disproportionate rates of Blacks, Latina/os and
immigrants being profiled, arrested, and jailed.184  Moreover, and as
was presented in detail in Part III, the mass incarceration and mass
immigrant detention schemes are perpetuated in part by prison indus-
try efforts to exploit societal and political oppressive norms against
marginalized people, ultimately resulting in increased profits from im-
prisoning more people.
But immigrant detention is different than the generalized scheme
of mass incarceration in important ways.  First, the immigrant partic-
ipates in the civil justice system in immigration court, governed by
civil law and operating under civil procedural rules and safeguards.
Although detention—the deprivation of liberty—and deportation are
severe penalties that can result from an immigration official’s deci-
sion, the immigration system offers fewer protections than the crimi-
nal justice regime.185  As one example, detained immigrants must
seek out and pay for their lawyers, even if they are indigent.  Not sur-
prisingly, then, many do not have legal representation.186  In the im-
migration system, immigrants’ rights to due process and their
opportunities for bond are severely limited (if provided at all).187  Fur-
cial discrimination’ became legitimate safeguards to protect the homeland—a
homeland that Muslims find increasingly antagonistic to their presence, despite
their status as United States citizens.”).
184. See ALEXANDER, supra note 34, at 105–33 (discussing (1) how statutory, constitu-
tional, and common law considerations all play a role in the focused policing,
prosecution, and imprisonment of minority communities, including, for example,
through codified categorization of severity of drug arrests; (2) Supreme Court ju-
risprudence upholding police practices of racial profiling and racially homoge-
nous jury composition; and (3) the reality of police discretion in targeted arrests);
Johnson, supra note 65, at 589 (noting the parallels of the same type of targeting
of Black communities directed at immigrants).
185. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 472 (2007)
(describing the similarities but critical asymmetries between criminal justice
norms and the immigration law system).  “[F]eatures of the criminal justice
model that can roughly be classified as enforcement have indeed been imported”
into the immigration system. Id.  However, features “that relate to adjudica-
tion—in particular, the bundle of procedural rights recognized in criminal
cases—have been consciously rejected.” Id.  Thus, to the extent that immigration
law builds or imports criminal justice concepts, Legomsky argues that “immigra-
tion law has been absorbing the theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities of
the criminal enforcement model while rejecting the criminal adjudication model
in favor of a civil regulatory regime.” Id. at 469.
186. See Mark Noferi, Deportation Without Representation: Immigrants Who Are De-
tained Should Have a Right to a Lawyer, SLATE (May 15, 2013), http://www.slate
.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/05/the_immigration_bill_
should_include_the_right_to_a_lawyer.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
6X2N-ENTS.
187. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281,
1301–04 (2010) (noting the emergence of a criminal immigration system that en-
snares immigrants but does not provide them constitutional safeguards or afford
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ther, there is only a limited right to judicial review of a governmental
officer’s decision to detain.188  More practically, immigrants—as non-
citizens—do not enjoy any metaphorical or literal voice to change the
system, as they are unable to vote and often have no support system
that can advocate on their behalf.189  Instead, immigrants often do not
speak English (or do not speak it well enough to adequately represent
themselves in an adversarial court setting) and have few, if any, eco-
nomic resources.190  In this sense, the immigrant as a non-citizen col-
ors the perceived identity as criminal in an even more severe way than
imprisoned U.S. citizens.  The following section elaborates on how
non-citizen identity serves as another oppressive measure that con-
tributes to the successful detention scheme.
B. The Immigrant Is Not a Citizen
The identity of U.S. citizen and all that it entails elucidates the
contrast with identity as non-citizen.  At bottom, citizenship affords a
political and social voice—the citizen can vote191 and has the right to
them the benefit of typical criminal adjudicatory processes, and using the 2008
Postville, Iowa ICE raids as one case study); Johnson, supra note 65, at 589 (not-
ing the severe effects on immigrants caught up in the U.S.’ “wars” on drugs and
terror, and stating: “[N]oncitizens, with fewer legal protections under the U.S.
Constitution and laws than American citizens, have proven to be the most vul-
nerable victims in the war on drugs and the war on terror.  Unlike U.S. citizens,
for example, noncitizens in both metaphorical wars can be subject to criminal
sanctions and deported or excluded from the United States. . . . Ultimately, many
of those directly affected had nothing to do with drugs or terrorism but simply
constitute collateral human damage in the ‘wars’ on those two evils.”).
188. See, e.g., Mary Bosworth & Emma Kaufman, Foreigners in a Carceral Age: Immi-
gration and Imprisonment in the United States, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 429,
437–38 (2011) (discussing the ways in which detained immigrants are treated
differently than those held in the general prison populations for criminal convic-
tions: “There is neither automatic judicial oversight of immigration detention
centers, nor independent review of ICE decisions to detain arriving asylum seek-
ers.  Unlike many prisoners, non-U.S. citizens detained by ICE are practically
denied the chance at judicial review of their detention.”).
189. See infra section IV.B.
190. See, e.g., COLUMBIA L. SCH. HUMAN RTS. INST. & NORTHEASTERN U. SCH. OF L.
PROGRAM ON HUMAN RTS. & THE GLOBAL ECON., EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE: EN-
SURING MEANINGFUL ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES, INCLUDING IMMIGRATION
PROCEEDINGS: RESPONSE TO THE SEVENTH TO NINTH PERIODIC REPORTS OF THE
UNITED STATES TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION (2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/AYC3-ERDS (acknowl-
edging that Latina/o immigrants, who are more likely to be targeted for removal
proceedings, are more likely to be poor, and therefore more likely to proceed with-
out counsel in their immigration cases).
191. Interestingly, a citizen can lose his or her right to vote if convicted of a felony.
See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE
UNITED STATES (Apr. 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/TEA3-P64X (“Since
the founding of the country, most states in the U.S. have enacted laws disen-
franchising people currently or previously having been convicted of a felony.”).  In
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speak out against the government.  Citizenship status affords the
holder assurance that (s)he is a lifelong member of the polity and,
even if (s)he commits a criminal infraction, (s)he still cannot be ex-
cluded from the country.  Thus, citizenship means freedom from the
most basic worries about personal security and loss of family, prop-
erty, or liberty.
The status as non-citizen, then, represents the opposite.192  As
Hiroshi Motomura concludes:
[T]he basic function of citizenship law is to decide that some individuals be-
long to society as full and formal members, while others are noncitizens and
thus outsiders in some meaningful respects.  Immigration law keeps some
noncitizens out of the United States.  It admits others but might later provide
for their deportation.  Under both U.S. and international law, a U.S. citizen
must be allowed into the United States, and citizens cannot be deported.  By
regulating noncitizens but not citizens, immigration and citizenship laws in-
herently discriminate on the basis of citizenship.193
Thus, immigration and citizenship laws create the hierarchy that
places citizens at top and outsider non-citizens at bottom.194  And
Congress creates and drafts the laws defining the contours of this
membership.  Through the constitutional mandates regarding birth-
right citizenship and as implemented by the complex network of laws,
regulations, and policies that delineate the rules and procedures of
birthright citizenship and of naturalization, Congress remains the
gatekeeper.  Indeed, absent a connection through a U.S. citizen par-
ent,195 an immigrant can achieve citizenship status only through nat-
uralization, the process for which is codified in the INA.196
This legal and political hierarchy has social consequences, too.  A
dominant societal rhetoric surrounding topics of immigration reform
and the influx and presence of undocumented immigrants in the
United States focuses on the second-class status of non-citizens and
this context, then, identity as criminal and the power of criminality outweighs
this deeply rooted facet of citizenship identity.
192. The author has written about how the immigrant identity as non-citizen is one
factor of political subordination that leads to stymied legislative reform because
laws that benefit immigrants are deemed less important than laws that serve to
benefit U.S. citizens, who are perceived as more worthy of legislative protections.
See Olivares, supra note 24, at 277–82.
193. Hiroshi Motomura, Who Belongs? Immigration Outside the Law and the Idea of
Americans in Waiting, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 359, 363 (2012).
194. See Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
447, 451 n.10, 461–62, 489–90 (2000) (arguing that the concept of citizenship is
always one of paramount importance that performs an enormous legitimizing
function and that the word “citizenship” “communicates the highest political
value”); see also Ediberto Roma´n, The Citizenship Dialectic, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
557, 567–68 (2006) (articulating that while the grant of citizenship is significant
because it guarantees certain constitutional rights, its real importance lies in its
identification of the individual as “an equal member of the political community”).
195. INA § 301(c)–(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c)–(h) (1994); id. § 309, 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1988).
196. Id. §§ 310–47, 8 U.S.C. § 1458.
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the prominence of protecting or securing the citizenship from their in-
fluence.  Public outcries about defending “American” jobs from immi-
grant workers—both unskilled labor and more highly skilled
employment—pervade the media.197  Similarly, and despite the fact
that undocumented immigrants are ineligible for most public bene-
fits,198 depictions of immigrants abusing the U.S. public welfare sys-
tems abound.199  These anti-immigrant attitudes also embody
xenophobic and nativist roots that influence the social and political
language and narrative, ultimately informing legislative outcomes.
For example, as D. Carolina Nun˜ez explores in a linguistic analytic
study, the connotations of “alien,” “immigrant,” and “citizen” “suggest
a hierarchical understanding of membership and status in American
English, where citizens rise to the top and aliens fall to the bottom of
the status hierarchy.”200  Based on her large-scale study of word usage
in contemporary media, academic text, and other genres of literature,
a clear narrative emerges:
[A]liens are non-human invaders or, at best, criminals.  Immigrants are per-
sons, but they are still outside the majority.  They are ethnically different,
poor, new, and otherwise not full members of the larger community.  Citizens
wear the crown in the membership hierarchy: they are ‘upstanding’ and ‘law-
abiding’ members of the community.201
Public portrayals of the non-citizen easily equate him or her with the
“illegal” or “illegal alien,” a pejorative term that serves to dehumanize
197. See, e.g., Karen Ziegler & Steven A. Camarota, Despite Recent Job Growth, Native
Employment Still Below 2007: BLS Data Shows All Net Employment Growth Has
Gone to Immigrants, CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS STUD. (Dec. 2014), http://cis.org/de-
spite-recent-job-growth-native-employment-still-below-2007, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/28TD-6J5E.
198. See Overview of Immigrant Eligibility for Federal Programs, NAT’L IMMGR. L.
CTR., http://www.nilc.org/table_ovrw_fedprogs.html (last updated Oct. 2011),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/G44A-JSH6.
199. See, e.g., The O’Reilly Factor: Talking Points Memo (Fox News television broad-
cast July 8, 2014) (discussing immigrants from El Salvador, Honduras, and Gua-
temala, O’Reilly commented: “[M]ore than 50% of immigrants from those three
countries use at least one major welfare program once they get here.  So the
Obama Administration is allowing millions of people to come in without the skills
necessary . . . to compete in the marketplace.  That’s creating an under-
class . . . .”); see also Most Illegal Immigrant Families Collect Welfare, JUDICIAL
WATCH (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.judicialwatch.org/blog/2011/04/most-illegal-im-
migrant-families-collect-welfare/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/Z7HM-VFXC
(“Surprise, surprise: Census Bureau data reveals that most U.S. families headed
by illegal immigrants use taxpayer-funded welfare programs on behalf of their
American-born anchor babies.”).
200. Nun˜ez, supra note 8, at 1550.  For her research, Nun˜ez undertook a corpus lin-
guistic study, i.e., “the study of large samples (‘corpora’) of natural language to
identify patterns and trends in language,” using the Corpus of Contemporary
American English to study the usage and context of “alien,” “immigrant,” and
“citizen.” Id. at 1520.
201. Id. at 1550.
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and ostracize immigrants from the citizenship.202  In fact, by shorten-
ing the noun-modifying adjective dyad to just the adjective as noun—
in other words, the “illegal alien” becomes the “illegal”—personhood is
completely erased,203 ultimately converting the immigrant to a thing,
easily commodified as a good or exploited for labor or service.
To be sure, this discussion regarding the dichotomy between citi-
zen and non-citizen is not to suggest that the distinction should be
meaningless.  Hiroshi Motomura asserts that discrimination based on
citizenship is inherent in a system of citizenship, which serves in part
to foster civic solidarity and to bolster social and political order.204
Yet, as Motomura continues, the integration of immigrants within the
spectrum of citizenship—as future citizens—promotes ideals of equal-
ity while preserving this important national and civic solidarity.205
Thus, the incorporation of immigrants into a broader conception of cit-
izenship is critical to a more just immigration system.
But such incorporation may be little more than an ideal, especially
as the reality of immigrant identity in the United States is indeed
marked by factors of inequality as compared with U.S. citizens.  Immi-
grants in the United States experience high rates of poverty and food
insecurity and low rates of educational attainment.206  Many do not
speak or write English fluently207 and, if employed, often have low-
wage jobs and little job security.208  Their position as an economic,
educational, and social underclass exacerbates the political subordina-
tion they experience and eases the way for political and corporate
exploitation.
202. See Painter, supra note 8, at 667.
203. Id. at 667–68 (describing the effect of this grammatical shorthand: “This short-
hand phrase allows an adjective embodying the mask of illegality to become a
noun describing the person, conveying the fact that our society deems other as-
pects of personhood in this context to be irrelevant.  A different and more specific
noun is ordinarily used to describe an object illegally imported into the jurisdic-
tion or illegally manufactured in the jurisdiction, such as an illegal drug or an
illegal rendition of a copyrighted movie, but an illegal person can simply be re-
ferred to as an ‘illegal.”’).
204. See Motomura, supra note 193, at 355 (describing the civic ordering benefits of
national borders defining “citizenship”).
205. Id. at 356 (detailing the ways in which immigrants should be conceived of as
future citizens (i.e., “Americans in waiting”) such that the concept of citizenship
remains robust while also inclusive of principles of equality).
206. See, e.g., Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Frequently Requested Statistics on Immi-
grant and Immigration in the United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Feb. 26,
2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-im-
migrants-and-immigration-united-states, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/J7AQ-
MHVJ.
207. See KATHERINE E. GARRETT, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., LIVING IN AMERICA:
CHALLENGES FACING NEW IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES 5 (2006), archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/8AP6-U927.
208. Id. at 9.
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In this regard, it is striking to examine the dehumanizing and
profit-centered language used by corporate prison entities in discuss-
ing their detention practices.  In one infamous example from the earli-
est days of the private prison industry, one of the founders of CCA
boasted of their operational goals, declaring that the prison business
was “just like you were selling cars, or real estate, or hamburgers.”209
More recently, in its 2014 disclosure reporting form to the Securities
and Exchange Commission, CCA detailed its involvement with the
family residential centers housing mother and children immigrants
and noted that the operation of these facilities was more costly than
general prisons and had unique management risks, stating:
Providing this type of residential service subjects us to new risks and uncer-
tainties that could materially adversely affect our business, financial condi-
tion, or results of operations.  For instance, the new contract mandates
offender to staff ratios that are higher than our typical contract, requires ser-
vices unique to this contract (e.g. child care and primary education services),
and limits the use of security protocols and techniques typically utilized in
correctional and detention settings.  These operational risks and others asso-
ciated with privately managing this type of residential facility could result in
higher costs associated with staffing and lead to increased litigation.210
The disclosure continues and discusses the recent lawsuit against
DHS regarding the continued detention of mothers and children for
the DHS-stated purpose of serving as a deterrent for future migra-
tion.211  The District Court for the District of Columbia granted the
plaintiffs’ injunction, holding that the government may not rely on de-
terrence as a reason to continue to hold the immigrants.212  The CCA
disclosure mentions the lawsuit and how it represents a potentially
risky future for the company:
[I]t is possible that this or other lawsuits could adversely affect the contract,
including changes to the contract that are less beneficial to us or which im-
pose costs (such as to repurpose the facility for other detainees), or an outright
termination of the contract.  Any adverse decision with regard to this contract
could materially affect our financial condition and results of operations.213
The immigrant, then, is simply a commodity, representing profits
to be gained or lost depending on whether or not governmental policy
shifts towards alternatives to detention rather than continued impris-
onment.  Even with the increased numbers of mothers and children
immigrants, which ultimately sparked a measure of public and politi-
cal outcry, the rhetoric on their illegality and lack of citizenship dehu-
manizes them, with one newspaper headline stating, for example:
209. DIRTY THIRTY, supra note 101, at 1.
210. Corrections Corp. of Am., Annual Report (form 10-K) (Feb. 25, 2015), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/8DVM-FCZW
211. See id. (discussing R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164 (D.D.C. 2015)).
212. See Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164.
213. See Annual Report, supra note 210.
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“Flood of Illegal Immigrants to Pour into [New York City] Schools.”214
Evoking images of raging, uncontained waters rather than schoolchil-
dren seeking an education, the media perception fuels and is fueled by
dominant public narratives.  Thus, by casting immigrants as outsiders
and outcasts that are affiliated with lawlessness, physical and mental
feebleness, and immoral or depraved conduct, laws, and policies that
target immigrants (like the INA provisions on detention) or treat them
in an inhumane manner (like the corporatization of detention facili-
ties) actually match the societal perception.
As Nun˜ez writes regarding the immigrant alien imagery:
Such imagery threatens the humanity with which we treat noncitizens.  “By
distinguishing between aliens and persons, society is able to reconcile the dis-
parate legal and social treatment afforded the two groups.”  It is much more
palatable to deny rights to an “alien” than it is to deny rights to a “per-
son.” . . . In short, an “alien” does not belong.  She is not a member, and she
has few rights.215
Adding this to the immigrant’s literal political silence by disen-
franchisement and other oppressive forces due to perceived criminal-
ity and racial subordination, the law’s response to detain them is
unsurprising.  With the additional presence of corporate influence
benefiting from their detention, the path to higher rates of incarcera-
tion is smoothed.
C. The Immigrant Is a Person of Color
Racial and ethnic discriminatory practices that have prevented im-
migrants of color from achieving access to American society have also
served to create a system of oppression.  Indeed, inextricably inter-
twined with identities of criminality and non-citizen, the identity as a
person of color serves as a powerful subordinating force that further
allows for both the individual’s continued informal marginalization
and formalized incarceration, perpetuated by targeted political and
corporate influences.
To be sure, the history of immigration law and policy is a history of
racial and ethnic discrimination.216  At its earliest, federal immigra-
tion law developed in part as a reaction to Chinese immigration, with
the intent to stop the flow of Chinese people into the United States.  In
the 1889 case of Chae Chan Ping v. United States,217 the U.S. Su-
214. Susan Edelman & Isabel Vincent, Flood of Illegal Immigrants to Pour into NYC
Schools, N.Y. POST (Nov. 23, 2014), http://nypost.com/2014/11/23/city-schools-
warned-of-plans-to-enroll-2350-migrant-children/, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/NK38-VZK3.
215. Nun˜ez, supra note 8, at 1555 (quoting Johnson, supra note 8, at 273).
216. The author has written about the discriminatory history of immigration law
along racial and ethnic lines. See Olivares, supra note 24, at 264–70.  This sec-
tion uses information from and builds upon that previous work.
217. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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preme Court upheld congressional plenary power to restrict the immi-
gration of Chinese immigrants to the United States, echoing much of
the same tenor as in present-day restrictionist narratives, though
with obvious and explicit racist goals218—as opposed to the current
implicit racism pervading the anti-immigrant rhetoric.  Chinese immi-
grants were initially welcomed in the west coast, or at least tolerated,
as they provided cheap or indentured labor for the railroad and gold
mining industries.219  But as their numbers increased, and as they
began to compete with U.S. citizens for jobs and assert themselves
more permanently in U.S. cities and communities, “the consequent ir-
ritation, proportionately deep and bitter, was followed, in many cases,
by open conflicts, to the great disturbance of the public peace.”220
Moreover, the Court continued in Chae Chan Ping:
The differences of race added greatly to the difficulties of the situa-
tion. . . . [T]hey remained strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves,
and adhering to the customs and usages of their own country.  It seemed im-
possible for them to assimilate with our people, or to make any change in their
habits or modes of living.221
Thus, the Court upheld the federal Chinese Exclusion Act, in part be-
cause the “presence of Chinese laborers had a baneful effect upon the
material interests of the state, and upon public morals; . . . their immi-
gration was in numbers approaching the character of an Oriental in-
vasion, and was a menace to our civilization.”222
Though perhaps shocking in comparison to contemporary mores,
this formal racism in immigration law continued throughout the nine-
teenth and into the twentieth centuries, targeting Asian, Latina/o,
and African immigrants and other members of the “Black race,” while
protecting immigration from western and northern Europe.223  As one
218. See id.
219. See id.; see also Lakshmi Gandhi, A History of Indentured Labor Gives ‘Colie’ Its
Stings, NPR (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2013/11/25/
247166284/a-history-of-indentured-labor-gives-coolie-its-sting, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/6LZC-29CR (explaining the origin of the pejorative term “coolie”
to denote Chinese immigrants employed in the American railroad industry); Im-
migration, Railroads, and the West, HARVARD U. LIBR. OPEN COLLECTIONS PRO-
GRAM, http://ocp.hul.harvard.edu/immigration/railroads.html (last visited Feb.
16, 2016), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/P5J7-KYDV (describing immigrants’
work on American railroads between 1789 and 1930).
220. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 595.
221. Id.; see also Motomura, supra note 193, at 368–69 (noting one effect of Chae Chan
Ping on later immigration law and policy: “One common justification offered for
such laws was these groups’ alleged unwillingness or inability to integrate into
U.S. society. . . . This attitude toward integration was evident in various racial
restrictions embedded in citizenship laws, which only became expressly race-neu-
tral in 1952.”).
222. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 595.
223. See IAN HANEY LO´PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 27
(10th ed. 2006) (noting the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, the
creation of the “Asiatic barred zone” in 1917, a Senate bill excluding “all members
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example, intending to stymie the immigration of people of color who
had maintained relatively high levels of immigration in the early
1900s, the Immigration Act of 1924 created a national origins quota
system that restricted the annual immigration of people from any par-
ticular country to no more than 2% of the number of noncitizens from
that country who were represented in the 1890 U.S. census.224  The
quota intended to “confine immigration as much as possible to western
and northern European stock”225 and to slow down the immigration
from southern and eastern European countries.
The explicit preference for northern European and other white im-
migrants continued through much of the twentieth century.226  With
the belief that white immigrants would more easily assimilate into a
dominant “American” culture,227 policies regarding immigration and
naturalization were centered on prioritizing white people and ostra-
cizing immigrants of color.228  These pervasive efforts to keep out im-
migrants of color manifested in various ways, including the targeting
of Latina/o immigrants—especially Mexicans—who constitute the ma-
jority of the Latina/o immigrants.229  As a historical example, during
the Great Depression, Mexican immigrants, many of whom had come
to the United States to work in agricultural and other manual labor
of the African or black race,” and a quota system designed to limit immigration to
western and northern Europeans); Motomura, supra note 193, at 368 (similarly
discussing the racialized history of the laws); Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immi-
gration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A “Magic Mirror” into the Heart of
Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1120, 1127–30 (1998).
224. See Johnson, supra note 223, at 1127–28 (recognizing that Congress passed the
quota system after passing legislation requiring a literacy test that excluded all
illiterate aliens over the age of sixteen).
225. LO´PEZ, supra note 223, at 27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
226. See Motomura, supra note 193, at 369–71; Johnson, supra note 223, at 1129–30
(recognizing that the national origins quota system was designed to preserve the
traditional cultural and sociological balance of the United States); LO´PEZ, supra
note 223, at 27 (stating that the restriction on immigration to the United States
on the basis of race lasted from 1880 until 1965).
227. See Motomura, supra note 193, at 369 (discussing the connection between racial
restrictions and naturalization and the ways in which these restrictions evinced a
political understanding that white immigrants would easily assimilate, integrate,
and ultimately choose to be U.S. citizens).
228. See id.; Johnson, supra note 223; LO´PEZ, supra note 223.
229. Immigrants from Mexico have long constituted the largest group of Latina/o im-
migrants in the United States, comprising 28% of all immigrants in 2013—far
above El Salvador, the nation with the second largest total group of Latina/o im-
migrants in the United States at 3%. See Largest U.S. Immigrant Groups Over
Time, 1960–Present, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pro-
grams/data-hub/charts/largest-immigrant-groups-over-time (last visited Oct. 12,
2015), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/4NFQ-Y8XR (presenting the U.S. immi-
grant population as a moving pie chart relevant to the country of origin up to
2013).
2016] IMMIGRATION DETENTION 1009
jobs left vacant by World War I, were deported in record numbers.230
Having received temporary lawful status for the sole purpose of pro-
viding cheap labor for the United States through the Bracero program,
which operated from 1924 until its formal end in 1964, millions of
Mexican immigrants and others of Mexican ancestry were forcibly re-
moved at various points during its operation and at the program’s
end.231  Many of those deported were U.S. citizens.232
By the time the Immigration Act of 1965 finally repealed the na-
tional origin quota system (which had effectively prohibited the immi-
gration of people of color) and replaced the provisions with race-
neutral language,233 immigration law and policy had condemned im-
migrants of color in such oppressive ways that the discriminatory ef-
fects continued.234  Moreover, the end of the national origin quota
changed the demographic makeup, most notably by increasing the
230. See Motomura, supra note 193, at 370; S. POVERTY L. CTR., CLOSE TO SLAVERY:
GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES (2013 ed.), archived at http://per
ma.unl.edu/RM8T-MRAC (explaining that World War I brought migration from
Europe largely to a halt and created a greater demand for Mexican labor, and
with the advent of the Great Depression Mexican workers were seen as a threat
to American jobs, leading to their forcible deportation).
231. LO´PEZ, supra note 223, at 27 (citing U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TAR-
NISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION 10 (1980)) (sug-
gesting that the mass deportation of approximately 500,000 Mexican immigrants
was spurned by the economic distress of the Great Depression); see also Kevin R.
Johnson, The Forgotten “Repatriation” of Persons of Mexican Ancestry and Les-
sons for the “War on Terror,” 26 PACE L. REV. 1, 2, 4 (2005) (noting that up to 1
million people were removed); Va´zquez, supra note 115, at 621–22 (discussing the
repatriation of Mexican immigrants and their forcible removal during “Operation
Wetback,” which began in 1954).  Va´zquez also writes about the racialized and
oppressive mechanisms at work in the temporary immigration labor provisions
that targeted Mexican immigrants during this time:
Temporary worker programs ensured that Latinos remained temporary
and marginalized . . . . Latinos were tied to their employer, they were
tied to a specific occupation, wages were low, and they could not remain
permanently in the United States.  Furthermore, they could not bring
their spouse or children as such actions might cause them to try to reside
permanently in the country.
Id. at 620.
232. See LO´PEZ, supra note 223, at 27; Johnson, supra note 231, at 4.
233. INA, Amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see also Kevin R. Johnson, The Intersection of Race
and Class in U.S. Immigration Law and Enforcement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1, 2–3 (2009) [hereinafter Race and Class] (adding that the 1960s Civil
Rights Movement led to the elimination of the quota system in the 1965 INA
amendments); Johnson, supra note 223, at 1131 (same).
234. See, e.g., Race and Class, supra note 233, at 2 (exploring the historical connec-
tions between race and poverty in anti-immigrant legislation, which continued to
oppress immigrants after the repeal of the quota system: “At bottom, U.S. immi-
gration law historically has operated—and continues to operate—to prevent
many poor and working noncitizens of color from migrating to, and harshly treat-
ing those living in, the United States.”).
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numbers of Asian and Latina/o immigrants.235  At that point, then—
the formalized racism of immigration law having been dismantled—
the oppressive mechanisms became more implicit and facially neutral.
Yolanda Va´zquez asserts, for example, that Congress continues to ex-
ercise its plenary power to uphold racially discriminatory immigration
laws “on the basis of national security and absolute sovereign
power.”236  Similarly, as proxies to racially motivated discrimination,
other laws and policy provisions credit the protection of American jobs
from immigrant competition and of American cities and towns from
supposed alien criminal threats.
Examples of these laws and policies abound both in the historical
record and in contemporary times.  For example, the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1965 restricted the number of people who could mi-
grate from the Western Hemisphere to only 120,000 individuals per
year.237  The emphasis of this particular limitation was purposeful as
“part of a compromise to those who feared a drastic upswing in Latin
American immigration.  Consequently, Congress coupled more gener-
ous treatment of those outside of the Western Hemisphere with less
generous treatment of Latin Americans.”238  Moreover, the Immigra-
tion Act of 1965 imposed an annual immigration limit of 20,000 people
from each foreign country,239 which detrimentally and disparately af-
fected immigrants of color from certain developing countries, like
Mexico, the Philippines, and India.240  As the ceiling pertained to
Mexicans, for example, the 20,000-person limit worked to drastically
reduce Mexican immigration.241  Moreover, the fervor against
235. See Motomura, supra note 193, at 370; Johnson, supra note 8, at 282.
236. Va´zquez, supra note 115, at 626.
237. Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 921 (repealed 1976); see also Johnson, supra note
223, at 1131 (noting the immigration limits on peoples from the Western Hemi-
sphere after Congress dissolved immigration barriers based on race).
238. Johnson, supra note 223, at 1132; see also Va´zquez, supra note 115, at 631
(describing how the Immigration Act of 1965 curtailed legal immigration from
Latin American countries).
239. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, sec. 2, 79 Stat.
911, 911–12 (codified as amended at INA § 202(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1986)); see
also Johnson, supra note 223, at 1333 (noting the various caps Congress has
placed on immigration from the developing world).  The 1990 Immigration Act
altered this quota and instituted a world-wide ceiling of 675,000 immigrants,
while also changing the per-country limitations. See Michael J. Greenwood &
Fred A. Ziel, The Impact of the Immigration Act of 1990 on U.S. Immigration,
U.C. DAVIS, http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/cir/greenwood/combined.htm (last
visited Aug. 5, 2015), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/PQ2X-H4MK.  Moreover,
the Western Hemisphere restrictions were repealed by the INA amendments of
1976.  INA Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, sec. 2, 90 Stat. 2703, 2703
(codified as amended at INA § 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2009)).
240. See Johnson, supra note 223, at 1333.
241. See Va´zquez, supra note 115, at 631 nn.195–96 (citing MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE
SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 261 (2004)) (ex-
plaining the shift in immigration rates after the 1976 INA amendments: “[I]n the
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Latina/o immigration in the 1960s and into the 1970s (and particu-
larly directed still at Mexicans at this point) was emphasized by court
decisions, which constitutionally upheld immigration checkpoint stops
that target people based on their apparent Mexican ancestry,242 and a
state law provision targeting the employment of undocumented Mexi-
cans.243  As Mexican migration continued, Congress responded with
the Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986 (IRCA), which,
among other provisions, included sanctions against employers for hir-
ing undocumented workers244 and disproportionally affected Mexican
immigrants.245
More recently, immigration regulations implicitly targeting people
of color include federal enforcement efforts like Secure Communi-
ties,246 the purpose of which was to join local law enforcement agen-
cies with ICE to catch and deport criminal aliens.247  State efforts to
early 1960s, 200,000 Mexicans were admitted under the Bracero program and
35,000 permanent residents each year.”).
242. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976).  In his dissent,
Justice Brennan argued the illogic of the majority opinion. Id. at 572 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (“The process will then inescapably discriminate against citizens of
Mexican ancestry and Mexican aliens lawfully in this country for no other reason
than that they unavoidably possess the same ‘suspicious’ physical and grooming
characteristics of illegal Mexican aliens.”).
243. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976) (noting the deleterious effects of
illegal immigration on working conditions and competitive markets for Ameri-
cans and the special problem of California, which enacted the employment provi-
sion: “These local problems are particularly acute in California in light of the
significant influx into that State of illegal aliens from neighboring Mexico.”).
244. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603,
§ 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. 3359, 3360–74 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a
(2012)); see also Leticia R. Saucedo, Mexicans, Immigrants, Cultural Narratives,
and National Origin, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305, 330 (2012) (outlining the discrimina-
tory immigration-targeted provisions of this time period and how the implemen-
tation of such laws, including IRCA, bolstered the “illegal alien” narrative: “With
more than a million workers of Mexican national origin working [in] the United
States, the status of ‘illegal’ was inevitable.”).
245. See Saucedo, supra note 244, at 330.
246. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844,
2050 (2007) (appropriating $200 million to the Department of Homeland Security
to enhance efforts to remove aliens from the United States after they are deemed
deportable for being convicted of a crime or sentenced to imprisonment).
247. See Secure Communities: Get the Facts, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/secure-communi-
ties#a1 (last visited July 30, 2015), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/SF5B-R48U
(attempting to resolve “confusion” about the mandatory nature of the Secure
Communities program by clarifying that jurisdictions “cannot opt out” of the pro-
gram); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., ICE Unveils Sweep-
ing New Plan to Target Criminal Aliens in Jails Nationwide, ICE (Apr. 14, 2008),
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/0804/080414washington.htm, archived at http:/
/perma.unl.edu/8A2J-M52U (adding that one of the most important features of
the plan is the distribution of integration technology that will link local law en-
forcement agencies to DHS and Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) biometric
databases).
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curtail immigration, like the now largely defunct S.B. 1070 Arizona
law248—or the perceived ill effects of immigrants on their states—
have also served as a facially neutral proxy to profile immigrants of
color, particularly Latina/os.  Using the cloak of securing the borders
against terrorist threats, efforts like Secure Communities and S.B.
1070 disproportionately targeted immigrants of color for arrest, deten-
tion, and deportation.249  Indeed, many decried these efforts, assert-
ing that the measures unconstitutionally deputize local law
enforcement regimes with federal immigration authority and serve as
a proxy for racial profiling practices.250  Advocates filed lawsuits and
utilized other forms of advocacy to eventually discontinue and revamp
Secure Communities and to dismantle most parts of S.B. 1070.251
Yet, these historical and contemporary efforts highlight the fact that,
although neither federal nor local laws explicitly and formally include
racially or ethnocentrically prohibitive provisions, the practical effect
of law and policy is to continue to disparately oppress immigrants of
color and, particularly, Latina/os.
248. See S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
249. See Va´zquez, supra note 115, at 650 (discussing how Secure Communities
targeted a disproportionate number of Latino men); Ramos, supra note 130, at
341 (concluding that communities intimidate residents with the Secure Commu-
nities program by placing people typically unnoticed by ICE in removal proceed-
ings, which creates a fearful group of second-class citizens).
250. See, e.g., Kristina M. Campbell, The Road to S.B. 1070: How Arizona Became
Ground Zero for the Immigrants’ Rights Movement and the Continuing Struggle
for Latino Civil Rights in America, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (asserting
that S.B. 1070 was the legislature’s attempt to rid the state of people who are or
appear to be Latino); Ramos, supra note 130, at 329 (proffering that the goal of
Secure Communities is to propagate racial bias through a flawed correlation of
people of Mexican descent with undocumented immigrants); Daniel Denvir, The
ICE Man: Obama’s Backdoor Arizona-Style Program, SALON (July 17, 2010, 7:01
AM), http://www.salon.com/2010/07/16/immigration_safe_communities_obama,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/SG5W-P3Q9 (pointing out the contradiction be-
tween the Obama administration’s condemnation of Arizona’s SB 1070 with its
support for the federal Secure Communities program, which in some cases has
had the same effect of racializing and criminalizing immigrants as did the Ari-
zona bill).
251. As discussed above, DHS terminated the Secure Communities program in No-
vember 2014 and replaced it with the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP). See
supra note 130.  As PEP was unveiled, however, some noted that the differences
between it and Secure Communities were small. See, e.g., Jon Greenberg, Fox
News Host: Obama Ended Program for Tracking Undocumented Immigrants,
TAMPA BAY TIMES PUNDIT FACT (July 8, 2015), http://www.politifact.com/
punditfact/statements/2015/jul/08/harris-faulkner/fox-news-host-obama-ended-
program-tracking-undocum/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/59DU-YR5Y (not-
ing that the main difference between PEP and Secure Communities is that PEP
is more about conviction than arrest); see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
2492 (2012) (enjoining as federally preempted all provisions of Arizona Law S.B.
1070 except the provision that allowed for officers to check the immigration sta-
tus of arrestees).
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Nowhere is this oppressive regime more evident than in the depor-
tation and detention rates of Latina/o immigrants.  In 2014, 96.7% of
the immigrants deported were from just eight Latin American coun-
tries: (1) Mexico (56% of the total removals); (2) Guatemala; (3) Hon-
duras; (4) El Salvador; (5) the Dominican Republic; (6) Ecuador; (7)
Nicaragua; and (8) Colombia.252  Indeed, the next two countries whose
citizens were most affected by ICE removal have populations of people
predominantly of color: Jamaica and Brazil.253  Interestingly, DHS
did not document in its 2014 Enforcement Report the demographics of
the detained immigrant populations.  The 2013 ICE Enforcement Re-
port, however, notes that of the 440,557 immigrants detained in 2013,
90% of them were from just four Latin-American countries: Mexico
(56%), Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.254  Geographic prox-
imity and poverty rates in these countries certainly play a large role in
who initially migrates to the United States—after all, general demo-
graphic data from 2012 suggests that 81% of undocumented immi-
grants hail from those same four countries, with Mexico accounting
for a majority of that percentage.255
Yet, as detailed above, the historical and contemporary statutory
and political obstacles to lawful migration for poor immigrants of color
from these countries, and the enforcement mechanisms that uphold a
system targeting these same populations certainly drive the over-
whelming numbers of Latina/o deportation and detention (96% and
90%, respectively).  Moreover, and as also explored above, the connec-
tions between unauthorized immigrant presence and criminality—
which, according to DHS, is one of the priority areas for detention and
deportation policy256—have not been established.257  Finally, it bears
repeating that the vast majority of those detained and eventually re-
252. See 2014 ICE ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 50, at 9.
253. See id.; see also The World Factbook: Ethnic Groups, CENT. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2075
.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/A7U3-P3KQ
(noting the predominance of people of color in Jamaica and Brazil).
254. See Simanski, supra note 46, at 6.
255. See BRYAN BAKER & NANCY RYTINA, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGR.
STATS., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN
THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2012, at 5 (Mar. 2013), archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/CT3V-FNYC (estimating that 81% of the undocumented immigrant popula-
tion in the United States were from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Hondu-
ras; 59% were from Mexico); see also Immigration Detention: Behind the Record
Numbers, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUD. (Feb. 13, 2014), http://cmsny.org/immigra-
tion-detention-behind-the-record-numbers/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
UM4Q-4W2R (noting the large percentage of detainees coming from the same
four Central American countries).
256. See ICE ENFORCEMENT REPORT 2014, supra note 50, at 5.
257. See supra section IV.A; see also Va´zquez, supra note 115, at 605 (discussing how
crime rates are actually decreasing while rates of immigrant detention
increased).
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moved do not have criminal records or have records of minor infrac-
tions.258  Thus, there is seemingly no correlation between the
demography of unauthorized immigrants and the rates of detention
and deportation of Latina/o immigrants if the DHS focus is really on
removing dangerous criminal aliens.259  Moreover, the emphasis on
demographic trends obscures the long-standing and well-established
racially discriminatory motives of immigration law and policy.260
In fact, the criminal immigrant focus is all but absent in the cur-
rent practice of detaining mothers and children.  Housed in minimum
security “family residential centers,” the mother and children immi-
grants are not deemed criminal threats by DHS,261 though, as noted,
they may be associated with rhetorical and stereotypical markers of
criminality.  Despite the lack of actual criminality, however, the wo-
men and children remain detained at a cost of approximately $266 per
day, per person262—money paid by American taxpayers to corporate
prison industry entities.  Not surprisingly, 97% of the apprehended
and detained “family units” (i.e., mothers and children) are from the
four same Latin-American countries that constitute the general de-
tained population: Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Mexico.263
Indeed, the markers of subordinated racial identity of these women
and children reinforce the dominate narrative upholding the disparate
incarceration of women of color.  As Kimberle´ W. Crenshaw asserts,
“[R]ace, gender, or class hierarchies structure the backdrop against
258. See supra section IV.A.
259. In July 2015, DHS reinforced its priority scheme for removals. See Jerry
Markon, Obama Administration Scales Back Deportations in Policy Shift, WASH.
POST (July 2, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/dhs-scales-back-de-
portations-aims-to-integrate-illegal-immigrants-into-society/2015/07/02/890960
d2-1b56-11e5-93b7-5eddc056ad8a_story.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
N2EL-MLY6 (“The [DHS] has taken steps to ensure that the majority of the
United States’ 11.3 million undocumented immigrants can stay in this country,
with agents narrowing enforcement efforts to three groups of illegal migrants:
convicted criminals, terrorism threats or those who recently crossed the border.”).
Although these priority areas essentially mirror prior enforcement goals, it re-
mains to be seen whether the demographics of detained and removed immigrants
will change pursuant to this latest proclamation.
260. See, e.g., supra section IV.B; Va´zquez, supra note 115, at 643–50 (discussing how
focusing on perceived criminality of Latinos ignores the effects of historical
racism).
261. See ICE FAMILY RESIDENTIAL STANDARDS, supra note 178.
262. See Chairwoman Mikulski Releases Summary of Emergency Supplemental Fund-
ing Bill, SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMM. (July 23, 2014), http://www.appropria-
tions.senate.gov/news/minority/chairwoman-mikulski-releases-summary-of-
emergency-supplemental-funding-bill, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/8ALJ-
247B.
263. See Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BOR-
DER PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccom-
panied-children (last visited Oct. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
55MB-YNQX (providing data for fiscal year 2014).
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which punitive policies interact” with other “social forces that situate
women of color within contexts structured by various social hierar-
chies and that render them disproportionally available to certain pu-
nitive policies and discretionary judgments that dynamically
reproduce these hierarchies.”264  In the context of the detained
mothers, the Latina immigrant is at the height of intersectional
marginalization (and the lowest part of the dominant hierarchy) as a
non-citizen person of color—and a woman judged by societal forces as
a bad mother for taking incredible risks in making the journey to the
United States.  Crenshaw notes of immigrant women:
[T]hey frequently face gendered double standards in that the sacrifices they
sometimes make for their children—leaving them with relatives, working long
hours to send money home, saving money so that they can be reunited with
their children—are perceived negatively in women when the same behaviors
in men would be considered heroic.265
Ultimately, these subordinating forces and societal judgments work to
strengthen the family detention machine.
Thus, the current system of facially neutral immigration laws and
policies operate to further subordinate immigrants of color, much like
the general criminal justice system targets people of color to fuel the
profit-driven phenomenon of mass incarceration, as discussed
above.266  The profit motives of corporate-run immigrant detention
centers similarly reap the benefits of the implicit legal and societal
methods to ensure the continued subordination of people of color.
Moreover, as non-citizens who are equated with criminality, the immi-
grant amounts to an easily commodifiable entity, as long as the
carceral system operates as a profit-driven industry.
V. DISRUPTING THE INTERSECTIONS: PATH TO CHANGE
As this Article asserts, the toxicity of immigrant detention is pow-
ered by the intersection of the corporatization of the prison industry,
the political and societal narrative against immigrants, and the inter-
sectionality of immigrant-subordinated identity.  Each of these ingre-
dients adds critical fuel to the current machine of immigrant
detention, as evinced by the recent governmental incarceration of
mothers and children.  Part V therefore argues that reform measures
must work to disrupt these connections between profitability and
oppression.
Two paths to change are presented here.  First, at its simplest, the
INA must be amended to restrict immigrant detention to the most
264. Kimberle´ W. Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking
Intersectionally About Women, Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418,
1427 (2012).
265. Id. at 1449.
266. See supra section III.A.
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critical cases.  But, more fundamentally and as a second concurrent or
parallel path, law and policy must eschew corporate profit as a goal in
immigrant detention, such that corporate industries are either banned
from the prison business or leave the business due to decreased profits
in the face of increased scrutiny.  In this regard, this Part discusses a
case study of how the pharmaceutical industry changed its practices of
manufacturing and selling drugs to U.S. states that used them for le-
thal injections.  This change in practice resulted from social and politi-
cal advocacy, as well as pressure against the companies that were
profiting from the drug sales.  The following analysis proposes placing
similar pressure on legislators to end the practice of contracting with
for-profit entities to build and operate detention facilities.  It also pro-
poses erasing the profit goals of detention altogether, so that the cur-
rent default to detention is not merely replaced by “alternatives to
detention” that are also for-profit.  This Part concludes that advocates
should pursue these paths to end the inhumane and unjust reliance on
immigrant detention.
A. Reforming the INA and ICE Implementation
At bottom, the simplest (though not perhaps the politically easiest
or most viable) path to reform is to amend the relevant INA provi-
sions, the operating guidelines regarding the mandatory and discre-
tionary detention of immigrants, or both.  The punishment of
detention as a denial of one’s physical liberty and freedom should be
instituted as a last resort for those criminal immigrants who legiti-
mately pose the greatest risk of violence or other serious threat to the
community.  As Garcı´a Herna´ndez argues, moving from a default re-
gime of detention to a process that actually encapsulates the civil na-
ture of immigrant detention would result in a system that
incorporates individualized hearings regarding a person’s dangerous-
ness, particularities of the person’s alleged wrongdoing, and his or her
likelihood of returning to a later hearing.267  Yet, reform resulting in a
wide diminution of reliance on detention does not have to necessarily
include statutory reform, but could instead involve revisiting the
means of implementing the law.268 Thus, rather than utilize prisons,
jails, and other detention centers, ICE could use alternative means to
267. Garcı´a Herna´ndez, supra note 24, at 1400–15 (arguing therein for statutory re-
form that disentangles civil immigration detention processes from the criminal
justice norms that have come to characterize the current detention system).
268. See, e.g., id. at 1406–09 (discussing, among other possible solutions, the reevalua-
tion of using supervised custody more broadly and ending the practice of using
traditional correction facilities); Torrey, supra note 85, at 128–31 (arguing for a
reinterpretation of the “custody” as detention mandate); supra note 26 and ac-
companying text (discussing how INA § 236(c), which mandates “custody,” could
be administratively interpreted to mean something other than physical
detention).
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ensure compliance with the INA’s intent in adjudicating and effectuat-
ing removals, or providing immigration relief, when appropriate.269
Furthermore, when resorting to detention, ICE must redouble its
efforts to regulate the operation and management of detention centers
to ensure total compliance with safety and health regulations.  Recent
DHS efforts to amend and strengthen its detention guidelines in the
wake of immigrant protests and hunger strikes in some of the deten-
tion centers illustrate that DHS can be responsive to calls for needed
reform.270  In short, there is nothing magical about the current system
of immigration detention; the ways in which immigrants are held can
occur through other less-intrusive and more humane means.
Broad statutory or regulatory reform, change in implementation,
or both would ease the burdens and effects of detention, which would
result in less corporate gain from the practice.  Another path to
change, however, would be to attack this nefarious corporatization of
the prison industry at its source.  In other words, law and policy must
break the intersection between corporate profit and immigrant
detention.
269. See, e.g., Garcı´a Herna´ndez, supra note 24, at 1407–09; Torrey, supra note 85, at
132–33; Das, supra note 29, at 159–63 (arguing for detention reform that pro-
vides a structure based on more individualized inquiry rather than broad ineffec-
tive procedures).
270. See News Release, ICE Announces Enhanced Oversight for Family Residential
Centers, ICE (May 13, 2015), http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-announces-en-
hanced-oversight-family-residential-centers, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
RF4Y-8KUL (“[ICE] announced a series of actions to enhance oversight and ac-
countability, increase access and transparency, and ensure its family residential
centers continue to serve as safe and humane facilities for families pending the
outcome of their immigration proceedings.”).  The enhanced oversight was in re-
sponse to reports of protests and hunger strikes by the women detained in the
family residential centers. See, e.g., Wil S. Hylton, A Federal Judge and a Hun-
ger Strike Take on the Government’s Immigrant Detention Facilities, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/06/magazine/a-federal-judge-
and-a-hunger-strike-take-on-the-governments-immigrant-detention-facilities
.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/C83Y-PR6Q.  But as Maunica Sthanki
writes regarding possible increased accountability in immigration detention, the
compliance mechanisms may be just as hard to enforce.  Sthanki, supra note 101,
at 450 (“Detention standards provide guidelines for detainee care; however, the
standards are unenforceable.  The standards provide for medical care and forbid
physical and sexual abuse; however, the standards do not create a remedy
whereby a detainee can challenge the facility’s adherence to the standard.  Deten-
tion abuse is compounded by the near total privatization of immigration deten-
tion.  Private-prison companies oversee almost every aspect of detainee life, and
recent Supreme Court decisions limiting the liability of private-prison companies
have virtually foreclosed an immigrant detainee’s cause of action in federal
court.”).
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B. Breaking the Corporate Connection to Detention
There is something unnerving (to many) about the practice of prof-
iting from imprisoning people.  The practice is commodification of
human suffering at its peak, and has been criticized by an array of
system actors and advocates.  One state corrections commissioner pre-
dicted in 1985 that the use of private prisons would create unavoida-
ble incentives for the prison to lobby for stricter crime laws, thereby
locking up more people with taxpayers footing the ever-increasing
tab.271  Hillary Clinton, a candidate in the 2016 presidential election,
decried the corporatization and profit-driven practice of immigrant de-
tention, noting that the practice inevitably leads to higher rates of de-
tention.272  Michelle Alexander warns reformers of the entrenched
private corporate interests that will oppose efforts to end mass incar-
ceration: “[Private prisons] are deeply interested in expanding the
market—increasing the supply of prisoners—not eliminating the pool
of people who can be held captive for a profit.”273  Geiza Vargas-Var-
gas similarly comments on the profit-driven incentives of private
prison interests and their stronghold in the immigrant detention busi-
ness, noting the racist similarities to the well-established mass incar-
ceration regime.274  All point to the conclusion that the practice of
profit-driven detention should be ended on principled grounds of hu-
manitarian and democratic goals of a society that protects the rights
of the vulnerable and oppressed.
To accomplish this end, activists and advocates should concentrate
on pushing corporate actors out of the business either through public
and political pressure on the supply side—i.e., companies profiting off
of immigrant detention—or on the demand side—i.e., governmental
and public agencies contracting with and paying the companies to do
so.  As an example of the public pressure model on the supplier side
(i.e., the corporations themselves), advocates can look to the recent
271. See Torrey, supra note 85, at 124 (citing Kenneth F. Schoen, Editorial, Private
Prison Operators, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/03/
28/opinion/private-prison-operators.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/2Q3L-
W79J).
272. See Elise Foley, Hillary Clinton Goes Big on Immigration, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 5, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/05/hillary-clinton-immi-
gration-reform_n_7217768.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/QY8Z-744E
(discussing her views on immigration detention, among other topics).  But Clin-
ton’s presidential campaign also benefits from private prison campaign contribu-
tions. See, e.g., Lee Fang, Private Prison Lobbyists Are Raising Cash for Hillary
Clinton, THE INTERCEPT (July 23, 2015, 12:49 PM), http://firstlook.org/theinter
cept/2015/07/23/private-prison-lobbyists-raising-cash-hillary-clinton/, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/E9WD-YG5H (revealing campaign contributions for Hillary
Clinton’s 2016 presidential bid by a lobbyist for the GEO Group).
273. ALEXANDER, supra note 34, at 218.
274. Vargas-Vargas, supra note 109, at 358 (“[A]nti-immigration policy . . . is the next
frontier in the incarceration of black and brown bodies.”).
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targeting of the pharmaceutical industry, which brought about (albeit
brief) change in the governmental execution of prisoners by lethal in-
jection.  To be sure, prisoners convicted of capital crimes and sen-
tenced to death are an unpopular and ostracized population in the
United States.275  Yet there is a strong movement founded in humani-
tarian, religious, democratic, and justice rationales against the death
penalty generally, and against the use of lethal injections to kill pris-
oners specifically.276  The trajectory of this movement and how it
worked to effectuate a halt to certain types of executions is
illustrative.
In 1977, Oklahoma was the first state to use lethal injections to
execute prisoners, considering the practice less brutal than the prior
use of hanging, firing squad, or the electric chair277 and basing its
decision on a thin foundation of research into a three-drug cocktail.278
Today, other death penalty states and the federal government also use
lethal injection, which is now the dominant method of execution.279
This three-drug cocktail included sodium thiopental, a general anes-
thetic that rapidly brings about unconsciousness, so as to render the
person unable to feel conscious pain.280  The World Health Organiza-
tion has listed sodium thiopental as an approved and essential anes-
thetic for surgical procedures for many years.281  But even though the
injection cocktail was supposed to result in “painless” and “humane”
275. See, e.g., Regina Austin, “The Shame of It All”: Stigma and the Political Disen-
franchisement of Formerly Convicted and Incarcerated Persons, 36 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 172 (2014).
276. See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau, The Case Against the Death Penalty, AM. CIVIL LIB-
ERTIES UNION (last updated 2012), http://www.aclu.org/case-against-death-pen-
alty, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/BV7D-YDSV.
277. See Kate Pickert, A Brief History of Lethal Injection, TIME (Nov. 10, 2009), http://
content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1815535,00.html, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/PE65-6YQ5; S.M., Death-Penalty Drugs: Dangerous Cocktails,
THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 29, 2015, 7:40 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/demo
cracyinamerica/2015/04/death-penalty-drugs, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
E5FP-WKGM.
278. See Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dis-
mantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 65, 74–75 (2007).
279. See Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFO CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
lethal-injection?did=1686&scid=64 (last visited Apr. 11, 2016), archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/EJ9Q-QB9P (noting that out of 1,411 executions conducted since
1976, 1,236 were carried out by lethal injection); see also Mary D. Fan, The Sup-
ply-Side Attack on Lethal Injection & the Rise of Execution Secrecy, 95 B.U. L.
REV. 427, 436 (2015) (demonstrating how anti-death penalty activists success-
fully took their battle to the market by campaigning against lethal injection drug
suppliers, causing a shortage of certain types of lethal injection drugs).
280. See Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Para-
dox Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says
About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 98 (2002).
281. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO MODEL LIST OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 18TH LIST
(18th ed. Apr. 2013), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/C4QB-3NN4.
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(or as humane as possible) executions, data-driven and anecdotal evi-
dence showed that prisoners suffered through exceedingly long and
physically agonizing executions even with the anesthetic.282  Thus,
this proof called into question the efficacy of sodium thiopental in the
lethal-injection context.
Critics of the death penalty brought a legal challenge against the
legal injection protocol, asserting that the practice amounted to “cruel
and unusual punishment” when the sodium thiopental was improp-
erly administered, causing the prisoners to experience excruciating
pain once the other drugs were injected.283  Yet, in 2008—just as the
Supreme Court upheld the use of the death penalty in 1976284—the
Court upheld the use of lethal injection via sodium thiopental, holding
that the risks of improper administration of the anesthetic did not rise
to a violation of the Eighth Amendment.285
Thus unable to secure a halt of the practice in the courts, anti-
death penalty advocates took the fight to the marketplace.  The aim of
this supply-side attack was to persuade drug manufacturers to stop
supplying sodium thiopental to states that were using it for execu-
tions.286  Moreover, advances in anesthesiology had decreased the
market demand for sodium thiopental in other sectors, and most Eu-
ropean manufacturers had significantly cut production.287  Thus, one
company—Hospira, a U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturer—was left as
the main provider of the drug.288  Sensing an opportunity to eradicate
the drug from the lethal injection market, anti-death penalty advo-
cates used the media and political pressure to target Hospira—a
movement that resulted in Hospira ceasing its U.S. production of so-
dium thiopental.289  In response, though, Hospira sought alternative
282. See Denno, supra note 278, at 124 n.40 (describing the two-hour execution of
Christopher J. Newton in 2007).
283. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 49 (2008); see also Fan, supra note 279, at 436–37
(describing the historical strategies of anti-death penalty advocates).
284. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
285. Baze, 553 U.S. at 56.
286. See Fan, supra note 279, at 438 (quoting Nathan Koppel, Drug Halt Hinders Ex-
ecutions in the U.S., WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052748704754304576095980790129692, archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/CQU9-X89L (detailing the successful campaign by death penalty oppo-
nents against drug manufacturers supplying states with lethal injection drugs)).
287. Id. at 439.
288. See Erik Eckholm & Katie Zezima, Drug Used in Executions Dropped by U.S.
Supplier, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2011, at A11.
289. See Nathan Koppel, supra note 286 (describing the effects of Hospira’s announce-
ment that it will stop producing lethal injection drug sodium thiopental in the
U.S.); see also Jennifer Horne, Council of State Gov’ts, Lethal Injection Drug
Shortage, CAPITOL IDEAS, http://www.csg.org/pubs/capitolideas/enews/issue65_4
.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/LPH2-Q69U
(explaining the current shortage of legal substances to facilitate lethal injections).
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opportunities to produce the drug in Italy,290 where capital punish-
ment has been banned since 1889.291  The Italian government, re-
sponding to activism, moved in December 2010 to ban Hospira from
manufacturing the drug for capital punishment use.292  As a result,
Hospira, concerned about sanctions and its employees’ potential liabil-
ity, halted its global production of sodium thiopental.293
Prior to Hospira exiting the market, death penalty states prepared
for a potential shortage of sodium thiopental and thus turned to Euro-
pean pharmaceutical companies for its supply.294  Not surprisingly,
global activism against the death penalty swung into motion and pres-
sured the European corporations to ban sales of sodium thiopental to
the states.295  Initially, there was British support for continued sales
to the United States on the basis that the drug had other surgical an-
esthetic uses.296  Eventually, however, and faced with data that the
U.S. prison system was in fact a primary customer of the drug, Britain
290. See Associated Press, U.S. Drug Maker Discontinues Key Death Penalty Drug,
FOX NEWS (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/01/21/drug-maker-
discontinues-key-death-penalty-drug/#ixzz1BhqUFIxP, archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/PV8E-2X48 (“Without providing details, [Hospira spokesman Dan] Ro-
senberg said the company’s state-of-the-art Italian factory was the only plant ca-
pable of manufacturing sodium thiopental.”).
291. 6 INDRO MONTANELLI & ROBERTO GERVASO, STORIA D’ITALIA 215 (S. Romano ed.,
2010).
292. Emma Marris, Death-Row Drug Dilemma, NATURE (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www
.nature.com/news/2011/110121/full/news.2011.53.html, archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/C2NL-S9WM.
293. See Associated Press, supra note 290; see also Emma Draper, Death Penalty: Stop
Lethal Injection Project Case Briefing, REPRIEVE (July 28, 2011), http://www.re-
prieve.org.uk/publiceducation/2011_02_03_lethal_injection_drugs/, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/EZC6-KCCG (describing the successful campaign in Italy);
Statement from Hospira Regarding Its Halt of Production of Pentothal (Sodium
Thiopental), DEATHPENALITYINFO.ORG. (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.deathpenalty-
info.org/documents/HospiraJan2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/XY4J-
5WFZ (reporting that Italian authorities ordered Hospira to control the use of
their product to the ultimate end user in order to prevent use in capital punish-
ment, something that Hospira could not do: “[T]he use of Pentothal in capital
punishment procedures in the United States [was] a use Hospira has never
condoned.”).
294. See Raymond Bonner, Drug Company in Cross Hairs of Death Penalty Opponents,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/world/europe/
31iht-letter31.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/YS7V-SJB8.
295. See Matt Ford, Can Europe End the Death Penalty in America?, THE ATLANTIC
(Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/02/can-
europe-end-the-death-penalty-in-america/283790/; archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/FC7G-HMDY; Fan, supra note 279, at 439 (“European suppliers, including
the major Danish pharmaceutical company Lundbeck and a small British drug
wholesaler called Dream Pharma, soon found themselves the targets of a sham-
ing campaign . . . with a series of critical articles.”).
296. See Ian Dunt, Cable Under Fire for Allowing Execution Drug Sale, POLIT-
ICS.CO.UK (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.politics.co.uk/news/2010/11/2/cable-under-
fire-for-allowing-execution-drug-, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/2ELN-752L.
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joined the sales ban.297  Ultimately, in 2011, the entire European
Union banned the export of sodium thiopental and seven other drugs
used in lethal injections to the United States.298  Other smaller inter-
national pharmaceutical companies also banned the sale of the drug to
U.S. states, citing public pressure, risk of liability, and ethical con-
cerns.299  Thus, by 2011, the global campaign against corporate phar-
maceutical suppliers of lethal injection drugs had achieved
remarkable successes.300
And the campaign brought results.  In the death penalty states,
executions were routinely delayed or disrupted due to some combina-
tion of a shortage of the drug and the regulatory/legislative processes
required in some states to substitute another chemical.301  In
Oklahoma, for example, there were relatively no obstacles to switch
from sodium thiopental to pentobarbital, an anesthetic substitute;
Oklahoma also considered executing prisoners with just nitrogen.302
Tennessee only had to pass through a perfunctory departmental re-
view to approve a new lethal injection protocol.303  Maryland, Califor-
nia, Kentucky, and Ohio, on the other hand, have more complicated
and time-consuming regulatory and review processes before approving
new lethal injection cocktails.304  Moreover, public advocacy efforts
geared up again to focus on the pharmaceutical production and sale of
pentobarbital, and used an organized, multinational movement in-
volving social media, press releases, and stockholder publicity targets
297. See Peter Walker, Vince Cable Restricts Export of Drug Used in US Executions,
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/science/2010/nov/29/
sodium-thiopental-export-restrictions, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/W7DS-
Y87C.
298. See Ford, supra note 295; see also Juerden Baetz, Europeans Frustrate U.S. Ex-
ecutions, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Feb. 19, 2014, at A10 (“The EU then updated its export
regulation in 2011 to ban the sale of eight drugs—including pentobarbital and
sodium thiopental—if the purpose is to use them in lethal injections.”).
299. See Prasanna D. Zore, Under Pressure, Indian Firm Stops Sale of Lethal Injection
to US, INDIA ABROAD, Apr. 15, 2011, at A21 (“Indian drug companies that were
selling [sodium thiopental] . . . have announced that they will no longer sell the
substance.”); Ford, supra note 295 (showing changing practices in Europe).
300. See Fan, supra note 279, at 439.
301. See Horne, supra note 289.
302. See Associated Press, supra note 290; Associated Press, Death Penalty Complica-
tion: Pharmacists Group Discourages Providing Execution Drugs, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-pharmacists-
execution-lethal-injection-drugs-20150330-story.html, archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/YC52-XDVV; see also Horne, supra note 289 (describing the diminishing
sources of death penalty drug substitutes).
303. See Horne, supra note 289 (comparing state regulatory processes to change death
penalty-drug cocktail).
304. See id. Maryland abolished the use of the death penalty in 2013. US: Maryland
Abolishes Death Penalty, HRW (May 2, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/
02/us-maryland-abolishes-death-penalty, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/7H
RT-HJ3W.
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against the drug.305  The campaign resulted in pressuring at least one
manufacturer to stop the sale of the drug for executions.306
The movement was dealt a new blow in 2015, however, when the
Supreme Court upheld the use of another drug, midazolam, for lethal
injections.307  It remains to be seen, however, if the pressure on mar-
ket forces can be heralded once again to combat this chemical and halt
its corporate production and sale.  Moreover, and relevant to the focus
here, the anti-death penalty movement’s successes provide useful
analogies to the efforts to end immigrant detention.  In this way,
bringing societal and political pressure on the companies, sharehold-
ers, and other corporate actors may achieve an end to the widespread
use of the practice.308
Similarly, public pressure should be waged against legislators and
other policy actors to end the practice of contracting with for-profit
corporations and agencies to detain immigrants.  By attacking the de-
mand side of the connection between corporate profit and governmen-
tal detention, advocates may accomplish success towards curbing,
more heavily regulating, and ultimately ending reliance on the prac-
tice.  As one example of such advocacy, groups of activists, research-
ers, academics, and journalists have used Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests to gain insights into the governmental contracts of
the prison industry to expose the system and its contractual terms.309
305. See Fan, supra note 279, at 440 (describing the partnerships between British and
U.S. anti-death penalty advocacy groups such as Stop the Lethal Injection Project
(SLIP) and Reprieve, which targeted the production of pentobarbital using social
media, traditional media blasts, and stockholder organizing efforts to pressure
the Dutch company Lendbeck to halt pentobarbital sales).
306. As a result of the organizing campaign, Lendbeck dropped from 17th to 40th on
an annual ranking of the best companies in Denmark, and a pension fund sold its
shares in the company, all of which led Lendbeck to stop the sales of pentobarbi-
tal for executions. See id.
307. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
308. As one example of a successful public and media campaign, GEO Group had of-
fered to donate $6 million to Florida Atlantic University for the school to name
their football stadium after the company. See Chris Kirkham, GEO Group Sta-
dium Deal Is Off; Private Prison Company Cites ‘Ongoing Distraction’ After Pro-
tests, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/
02/geo-group-stadium-private-prison_n_2999133.html, archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/6MRD-U768.  Widespread protests by students, faculty, and activists en-
sued, arguing that the company violated human and civil rights; the national
media picked up the story. Id. As a result, GEO Group pulled out of the deal. Id.
309. See, e.g., Beryl Lipton, Does Your State Have a Deal with the Private Prison In-
dustry?, MUCKROCK (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/
2015/jan/05/cca-private-prison-contract-map/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
FB68-38WS.  The webpage presents an interactive map with a repository of con-
tracts existing between states and private management companies.  Other states,
however, have legislation that prohibits the disclosure of correctional facility in-
formation through FOIA requests, citing the possibility of compromising security.
Id. In contrast, some states’ laws require that these contracts be publicly availa-
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Other groups and publications have similarly utilized public media at-
tacks aimed at the corporate prison industrial complex, including the
harsh contractual quota provisions that many prison companies re-
quire of the governmental contracting agencies.310
Both types of investigation and public pressure help to bring to
light the problems with privatizing and corporatizing the prison sys-
tem as a profit-driven enterprise.  Indeed, some states have statutory
bans against entering into contracts with private corporations for the
operation of their prison system.  Despite this seemingly explicit proc-
lamation against contracting with private industry, however, that re-
sult does not always follow.  In Wisconsin, for example, Governor Scott
Walker, who has a history of ties with the prison industry,311 worked
around the Wisconsin ban on private prison contracts by shipping
Wisconsin prisoners out of state to private prisons in Ohio and Ken-
tucky, thus still directing Wisconsin tax dollars to private prison
companies.312
This example of demand-side public and political pressure that ul-
timately backfired in Wisconsin is further illustrative when consider-
ing “alternatives” to detention.  Scholars and activists who have
denounced the increased practice of immigrant detention point to
other less costly and more humane alternatives, like monitoring or su-
ble, thereby allowing the public to access the information without the need for a
FOIA request.  One nonprofit organization dedicated to exposing the inner work-
ings of the prison industry has litigated under these state laws to access various
types of information. See Legal Action, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, http://www.prisonle-
galnews.org/legal-action-map/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2015), archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/JU9R-A8M8; see also Ce´sar Cuauhte´moc Garcı´a Herna´ndez, Vt. Supe-
rior Ct.: Private Prison Corporation Is Subject to State Open Records Law, CRIM-
MIGRATION (Feb. 10, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://crimmigration.com/2015/02/10/vt-
superior-ct-private-prison-corporation-is-subject-to-state-open-records-law/,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/GMP7-3CF3 (describing one recent win by the
Prison Legal News in Vermont to access information regarding private prison
operations).
310. See, e.g., Profit for Private Prison Corporations, supra note 94 (discussing how the
contracts include a 90% occupancy guarantee in Ohio for the next twenty years
and a “staggering” 100% occupancy guarantee in Arizona); DETENTION WATCH
NETWORK & CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RTS., BANKING ON DETENTION: LOCAL
LOCKUP QUOTAS & THE IMMIGRANT DRAGNET (2015), archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/F2H7-F5XZ (exploring the lockup quotas that guarantee the prison compa-
nies a set amount of revenue despite occupancy rates).
311. See, e.g., Scott Keyes, How Scott Walker Built a Career Sending Wisconsin In-
mates to Private Prisons, THE NATION (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.thenation
.com/article/how-scott-walker-built-career-sending-wisconsin-inmates-private-pri
sons/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/WX78-2NV8 (discussing links between
Walker and prison lobbying efforts, campaign contributions, and legislative
amendments like the truth in sentencing laws that would increase prison
sentences).
312. See id.
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pervision.313  These types of practices certainly present important and
more attractive options than detention—allowing immigrants who
present no criminal, terroristic, or flight threat to remain free and
with their families while providing significant government savings.314
Indeed, alternatives to incarceration have achieved widespread sup-
port, even from groups traditionally aligned with strict crime-control
efforts.315  It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the same prison in-
dustries currently profiting off immigrant detention are entering the
market for privatized detention alternatives—including bond agencies
and monitoring services.316  In this regard, advocates must be vigilant
against replacing the detention default with another system of for-
profit supervision and monitoring, thereby risking the same panoply
of problems that define the corporatization of a process that is best left
for public regulation and operation.317
Each of these proposed solutions to the current overuse of deten-
tion provides possibilities for success, though none of them focuses on
313. See MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION, supra note 95 (“Given the predominately
non-criminal make-up of the immigration detention population as well as the ex-
pense and civil rights concerns surrounding detention. . . . Many immigrants cur-
rently in ICE custody could be safely released and, if necessary, monitored with
alternative methods, such as telephonic and in-person reporting, curfews, and
home visits.”); DEMANDING DIGNITY, supra note 180 (noting the same type of al-
ternatives); Garcı´a Herna´ndez, supra note 24, at 1409–12 (advocating similarly
for detention alternatives while cautioning against possible downsides of their
use).
314. See, e.g., MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION, supra note 95 (discussing the exorbi-
tant costs of detention in contrast to lower-cost alternatives).
315. See, e.g., Nicole Flatow, What It Means that Even the Koch Brothers Want to Pro-
vide Lawyers to the Poor, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Oct. 27, 2014), http://think-
progress.org/justice/2014/10/27/3584354/kochs-indigent-defense/, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/Q86T-TLJY (noting how the Koch Brothers, owners of Koch
Industries and often decried for their conservative or libertarian efforts to in-
crease corporate profits, have joined others in the effort to widen access to justice
for criminal defendants and otherwise ameliorate the effects of mass incarcera-
tion); Nicole Flatow, ALEC Doubles Down on Support for Less Draconian Prison
Sentences, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Sept. 27, 2013), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/
2013/09/27/2692491/alec-doubles-down-on-support-for-shorter-prison-sentences/,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/3BFG-36GR (discussing how the conservative
American Legislative Executive Council, which historically drafted model legisla-
tion that worked to increase prison sentences, is more recently supporting efforts
for prison alternatives).
316. See, e.g., James Kilgore, The Spread of Electronic Monitoring: No Quick Fix for
Mass Incarceration, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.prisonlegal
news.org/news/2015/apr/9/spread-electronic-monitoring-no-quick-fix-mass-incar-
ceration/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/GU35-JBQF (showing the rise of for-
profit electronic monitoring systems that leave the monitored with fewer rights
than prisoners).
317. See, e.g., Garcı´a Herna´ndez, supra note 24, at 1410–12 (discussing the complica-
tions with supervised release as an alternative to immigrant detention, including
heightened government surveillance and increased risk of violation of release
conditions, leading to severe consequences).
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the important subordination theory that undergirds the connections
between corporate profit and legislative enactment.  Indeed, it may be
that targeting corporate connections and the toxicity of such involve-
ment in the prison business is the most viable narrative to effectuate
real change, rather than focusing on the marginalized identity of the
detained immigrant population.  In this regard, political and public
rhetoric that speaks to the majority normative could be the most likely
to succeed, even if it is does not accurately question the identity polit-
ics behind the prison machine.318  To be sure, securing an end to un-
necessary immigrant detention—much like the move to end the
imprisonment of mothers and children—is a formidable goal that
must be pursued through all means, albeit incomplete ones.
VI. CONCLUSION
At some point, politics and profit give way to stark reality.  The
story of Me´lida, a thirty-year-old mother who travelled with her four-
year-old daughter from Guatemala and was eventually detained in the
CCA-run family detention center in Dilley, Texas, presents a glimpse
of that reality.  Gang members murdered Me´lida’s sister-in-law.319
When other members of the gang searched for her in retaliation for
her family members’ testimony in the murder trial, Me´lida took her
little girl, Estrella, and fled Guatemala for the United States.320  After
ICE apprehended them, the two spent nearly a year in family deten-
tion before their pro bono attorney successfully argued for their re-
lease.321  In an interview during her tenth month in detention,
Me´lida, who saw her toddler daughter exhibit signs of physical and
emotional distress while locked up, commented: “Sometimes I feel I
am drowning in my own desperation . . . . I want to shut myself in a
room and never come out.”322
Stories like that of Me´lida and Estrella abound and, indeed, are
not just limited to mothers and children.  The behemoth immigration
318. In this regard, the words of Professor Derrick A. Bell, Jr. ring prophetic.  As Pro-
fessor Bell asserted in the context of Brown v. Board of Education, school deseg-
regation happened when it finally did only because it served the interests of
white people.  Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (“Translated from judi-
cial activity in racial cases both before and after Brown, this principle of ‘interest
convergence’ provides: The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.  However, the
fourteenth amendment, standing alone, will not authorize a judicial remedy pro-
viding effective racial equality for blacks where the remedy sought threatens the
superior societal status of middle and upper class whites.”).
319. Preston, supra note 58.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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prison complex incarcerates hundreds of thousands of immigrants
every year, pursuant to congressional mandates and oppressive legis-
lative reforms and further buoyed by decades of judicial deference.
Moreover, the profit-driven corporatization of the prison industry fu-
els ever-increasing incentives for more detention.  The corporate
prison business capitalizes on societal and political rhetoric surround-
ing the “wars” on drugs and terrorism and the sound-bite politics that
push for stricter criminal penalties.  In the end, politicians are re-
elected, and the corporations get richer.
The intersection of this profiteering corporate model with the well-
established immigration detention regime is solid and built upon an
important lynchpin—the continued subordination of immigrants.  The
social and political subordination of immigrants, who embody the
marginalized identities of criminals, non-citizens, and persons of color,
feed the profit-seeking carceral machine.  Because immigrants are
deemed unworthy of protection due to this powerful intersection of
subordinated identities, corporatized monetary interests continue to
exploit their continued detention for increased profits while calls for
humanitarian protections are largely ignored.
But the stark reality of immigration detention—like the story of
Me´lida and Estrella—should not be ignored.  Immigration reform
must incorporate changes to the law and its implementation such that
immigration detention is not the default answer.  Moreover, looking to
examples of movements that disrupted profiteering practices, immi-
grant advocates can redouble their efforts to target both the demand
and supply side of profit-driven immigration detention so as to finally
effectuate change and shake the intersectional foundation.  Whichever
path to change is followed, immigration detention as we now know it
must end.
